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Abstract
This thesis focuses on the fundamental tensions that exist between the interests of 
the post-conflict State and those of the 'international community'. Focus will be on 
the appropriateness of alternatives to prosecution, specifically, the use of amnesties 
and truth commissions, and whether such alternatives can satisfy the need for 
accountability. In international criminal justice, it is often argued the only route to 
accountability is through formal prosecutions. However, does holding an individual 
accountable require formal prosecution and punishment? And could accountability 
be achieved in general terms without prosecution of all possible suspects? I will 
argue that the extraordinary nature of crimes within international criminal law, 
coupled with context specific situations, means there can be no one size fits all 
approach to achieving accountability.
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Introduction
This thesis on ‘[i]n the pursuit of accountability are there more appropriate 
mechanisms than prosecutions?’ principally explores the concept of accountability in 
an international criminal justice setting. For present purposes, international criminal 
justice will be defined as legal and other responses to widespread criminality, often 
encompassing the major international crimes, and often the result of civil war or 
sustained conflict.
There is somewhat of a conundrum about how a post-conflict society, which is going 
through a difficult transitional period, can move into a new era of peace. Many 
scholars argue that accountability through prosecutions holds the answer. However, 
this notion has become increasingly disputed by proponents of transitional and 
restorative justice.
Structure of this thesis
This research consists of seven chapters with the first two introducing the concept of 
accountability (in its many forms and contexts) and identifies recurring themes 
between the different contexts. Then using the common threads, seeks to apply 
these to international criminal justice settings. This analysis seeks a clearer 
understanding of accountability and how it can be achieved through the finding of the 
truth, seeking justice, and providing recognition.
Using the concepts of truth, justice and recognition the thesis moves on to firstly 
discuss two alternative mechanisms, amnesties and truth commissions (Chapters 3-
5
5). The discussion explores to what extent these alternatives can ascertain truth, 
achieve justice and provide recognition.
Lastly, the thesis focuses on the use of prosecutions and to what extent a trial 
followed by punishment satisfies the identified key concepts to provide 
accountability. This will be followed by a critical discussion of the merits of the 
alternative mechanisms as well as prosecutions (Chapter 6). Overall, this thesis 
seeks to assert that international criminal justice should not be reliant on 
prosecutions to provide accountability in a post-conflict society. And that, analytically 
or conceptually, ’accountability' should not be associated exclusively with personal 
guilt but should also be thought to be captured by wider restorative processes in 
post-conflict societies. According to Bovens, 'accountability' is a term used to cover 
a multitude of 'distinct concepts, such as transparency, equity, democracy, efficiency, 
responsiveness, responsibility and integrity'.1
1 M. Bovens, 'Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Frjamework' (2007) 13(4) 
European Law Journal at 449
Chapter One: The idea of accountability.
The purpose of this chapter is to address the complexity in defining accountability, 
but will identify the recurring themes within the literature. If someone is to be held 
accountable, what exactly does this mean? The traditional dictionary definition 
defines ‘accountable’ as: ‘1. required or expected to justify actions or decisions’ and 
‘2. explicable; understandable’.2
Mulgan states that ‘without mechanisms for demanding explanation, applying 
judgment and imposing sanctions, institutions that are designed to control will fail to 
achieve their purpose’.3 Mechanisms designed to control, such as legal regulation or 
political instructions, can be taken for mechanisms of accountability even when they 
do not directly involve any routine scrutiny or punitive response.4 However, a note of 
caution from Mulgan, is that no one type of institutional structure can be guaranteed 
to deliver effective accountability.
Accountability can be thought to encompass general structures whereby individuals 
are required to give an account for their actions (or inactions) between superiors and 
subordinates and vice versa. However, no one accountability structure fits all 
circumstances and a post-conflict environment is a good example of where we need 
to be flexible, and perhaps even experimental, in our approach (see below).
2 "accountable adj." The Concise Oxford English Dictionary, Twelfth edition . Ed. Catherine Soanes 
and Angus Stevenson. Oxford University Press, 2008. Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University 
Press. Sheffield Hallam University. Last accessed on 25 April
2012 httD://www.oxfordreference.com.lcproxv.shu.ac.uk/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entrv=t2 
3.e292
3 R. Mulgan, ‘Accountability: An Ever-Expanding Concept’ (2000), 78 (3) Public Administration at 566.
4 Ibid
Robert Behn explores the meaning of accountability and highlights the complexity of 
providing a one size fits all definition.5 However, Behn’s discussion is predicated on 
an assumption of public accountability. Accountability is a word widely used in many 
different contexts and one which Behn describes as an ‘elusive concept.’6 The 
literature contains many interpretations of the term ‘accountability’, but for 
Rubenstein his focus is on a ‘standard model of accountability.’7 That model needed 
here. Identifying a central core meaning of accountability, Behn attempts to define 
the terms ‘accountable’ as subject to giving an account answerable and capable of 
being accounted for: explainable: and ‘accountability’ is “the quality or state of being 
accountable, liable, or responsible.
‘Numerous definitions of accountability have been offered by scholars and 
practitioners of development.’8 The basis of their efforts often reverts back to a 
standardised form of accountability meaning, for example, financial auditing and 
clear chains of command and responsibility. However, whilst accountability is 
mentioned in relation to a wide range of areas including political, economic and legal, 
it is perhaps worth considering at some point why there seems to be a varied 
understanding of what accountability actually is, and whether it is important to have a 
standardised model of accountability. This remains beyond the scope of this thesis, 
but is certainly a topic for further research.
5 R.D. Behn, Rethinking democratic accountability (2001) Printed by R.R. Donnelley and Sons, 
Harrisonburg, Virginia at 2
6 Ibid
7 J. Rubenstein, 'Accountability in an Unequal World1 (2007), 69 (3) The Journal of Politics p.617.
8 A. Ebrahim, ‘Accountability in Practice: Mechanisms for NGOs’ (2003) 31(5) World Development at 
813.
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A one size fits all approach to what it means and how it can be achieved, even if 
possible, may not be preferable. Should a standardised definition be provided the 
challenge at this point is to determine whether that definition answers what, why, 
where and how accountability is to be achieved.
The literature concerned with exploring the meaning of accountability is focused on it 
in a broad sense. One such author, Koppell discusses five broad aspects of 
accountability, which include ‘transparency, liability, controllability, responsibility and 
responsiveness’.9 However, to focus on accountability which incorporates other 
somewhat complicated concepts, provides little clarity as to what is meant by 
accountability. Whilst it is acknowledged above that the concept of accountability 
proves elusive, it may be possible to have a more focused understanding of 
accountability by following Bovens’ discussion on conceptual and evaluative 
approaches.10
Conceptual
What does accountability mean? Accountability can mean different things in 
different circumstances: public and private, institutional and governmental, local and 
(inter)national. It is essentially an obligation on an actor to explain and to justify his 
or her conduct to a forum. An actor can either be an individual or an organisation. 
The forum is responsible for the drawing out the explanation from the actor and then
9 J. Koppell, ‘Pathologies of Accountability: ICANN and the Challenge of “Multiple Accountabilities 
Disorder”’ (2005) 65(1) Public Administrative Review aX 94, in M. Bovens, 'Analysing and Assessing 
Accountability: A Conceptual Framework' (2007) 13(4) European Law Journal at 450.
10 M. Bovens, 'Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework' (2007) 13(4) 
European Law Journal at 447.
passing judgement. The forum can be an individual, often a superior, an institution 
or a court.11
Account-giving consists of three facets. In the first instance the actor is under an 
obligation to explain their conduct, which includes the provisions of explanations and 
justifications. This requires more than the mere provision of information and may 
also require justification of specific acts or omissions. Secondly, it must be possible 
for the forum to question the actor about their conduct. Lastly, the forum must have 
the capacity to pass judgement, which could include a sanction and public 
condemnation.12
Evaluative
Bovens discusses the three evaluative perspectives of accountability which are 
democratic, constitutional, and a learning perspective.13 In essence, Bovens' 
evaluative perspective means individuals have to give an account for their actions to 
‘the people’, government or another forum which has no political (or punitive) powers 
but requires accountability as part of its institutional feedback processes and 
memory.
Bovens' discussion of accountability has a narrow and well-defined understanding of 
accountability and places it in a sociological setting. For Bovens, accountability is 
‘the obligation to explain and justify conduct’.14 In which happens in a forum where
11 Ibid at 450
12 Ibid at 451
13 Ibid at 462
14 Ibid at 450
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questions can be asked to fully understand the conduct or omission with the 
possibility of repercussions for the account giver.
Accountability holders and holdees
Behn asserts that accountability has ‘accountability holders and accountability 
holdees.’15 Accountability holders are those which hold an individual or institution 
accountable for their actions or inaction. Whereas accountability ‘holdees’ are those 
being held to account for their actions or inaction by providing answers and 
explanations.
Accountability and responsibility
Accountability is often more than the attribution of responsibility, it involves 
associating responsibility with penalties. Mulgan also explores the complex nature of 
what is meant by accountability and discusses the close association of accountability 
with responsibility.16 Whereas Behn’s assumption concerned public accountability, 
Mulgan focuses on private accountability and the role, responsibilities and 
expectations of accountability on an individual. In this context, where the focus is 
placed on an individual, ‘accountability is concerned with the constraining of 
power’.17
External (vertical) accountability
The account is given to some other person or body outside the person or body being 
held accountable; it involves social interaction and exchange, in that one side, that
15 R.D. Behn, Rethinking democratic accountability, (2001) Printed by R.R. Donnelley and Sons, 
Harrisonburg, Virginia at 1.
16 R. Mulgan,‘Accountability: An Ever-Expanding Concept’ (2000) 78 (3) Public Administration at 557.
17 R. Mulgan, Holding power to account Accountability in modern democracies (2004) London, 
Palgrave MacMillan.
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calling for the account, seeks answers and rectification while the other side, that 
being held accountable, responds and accepts sanctions; it implies rights of 
authority, in that those calling for an account are asserting rights of superior authority 
over those who are accountable, including the rights to demand answers and to 
impose sanctions.
The inclusion of sanctions in the core of accountability is contestable on the grounds 
that it may appear to go beyond the notion of ‘giving an account’. On the other hand, 
‘calling to account’, appears incomplete without a process of rectification.
Internal (horizontal) accountability
Internal accountability is variously described as ‘professional’.18 Accountability in this 
sense goes across or within an institution rather than to a higher authority, and as 
such, might be associated with self-regulation: giving an account to one’s peers 
rather than to an external or higher authority.19
Responsibility
Mulgan observes that1...’accountability’ now commonly refers to the sense of 
individual responsibility...’20 In fact accountability and responsibility are interlinked, 
so much so, that the terms seem interchangeable. Originally, however, 
‘...‘accountability’ was usually seen as part of ‘responsibility’ (the external aspect), 
the position is now often reversed with ‘responsibility’ taken to be a part of 
‘accountability’ (the internal aspect)’.21
18 R. Mulgan, Accountability: An Ever-Expanding Concept’ (2000) 78 (3) Public Administration at 556.
19 Ibid
20
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A middle ground between the two seems to have emerged. ‘Accountability’ can then 
denote one set of responsibility/accountability issues, those concerned with the 
‘external’ functions of scrutiny, such as calling to account, requiring justifications and 
imposing sanctions. This fits with the core senses of accountability, whilst 
‘responsibility’ is left to cover the ‘internal’ functions of personal culpability, morality 
and professional ethics.22 This distinction allows ‘accountability’ to stand on its own, 
no longer under the wing of ‘responsibility’, and thus recognises its contemporary 
meaning, while still confining it to its original, and still most widely accepted, sense.
As an overview of Mulgan’s discussion, external accountability seeks to investigate 
and assess actions taken (or not taken) by agents or subordinates and to impose 
sanctions. The extent to which individual agents or subordinates can fairly be held 
accountable for particular actions, particularly when it comes to the matter of 
sanctions, depends on whether they can be said to have been genuinely involved, in 
deciding those actions. Thus, external accountability and blame inevitably raise 
issues of individual choice and personal responsibility.23
Control
As well as a discussion on responsibility and its relationship with accountability, 
Mulgan also asserts further extensions of accountability. The first of these being 
control and to what extent accountability can be a method of imposing control. 
Mulgan argues that the core sense of accountability is clearly grounded in the 
general purpose of making agents or subordinates are called to account and, if
22 Ibid
23 M. Bovens, 'Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework' (2007) 13(4) 
European Law Journal at 561.
necessary, penalised as means of bringing them under control. An example 
provided by Mulgan is that of public organisations and how in a democracy, it is 
because the people wish to control the actions of public officials that they make 
these officials answer, explain and accept sanctions.
‘Control’ in the broadest sense of making public agencies do what the public and 
their representatives want, accountability and control are intimately linked because 
accountability is a vital mechanism of control.24 The challenge is creating an 
institutional framework, which embeds a control framework and allows for 
subordinates to hold ‘superiors’ accountable. This control framework feeds into 
compliance.
A further extension of accountability is responsiveness, which like control, refers to 
the aim of making governments accord with the preferences of the people. This 
involves the ability to anticipate needs, for example, it could possibly be an agency 
providing services to members of the public. O’Loughlin discusses the need to 
develop measures of accountability which include the extent to which officials 
anticipate the wishes of their superiors, thereby drawing attention to the importance 
of anticipated reactions by officials as part of the effect of scrutiny mechanisms.25 
That is, the effectiveness of accountability mechanisms is to be observed not simply 
in the occasions when officials are actually brought to account. Mulgan argues that
24 R. Mulgan, R. ‘Accountability: An Ever-Expanding Concept’ (2000), 78 (3) Public Administration at 
563.
25 M.G. O’Loughlin, ‘What is bureaucratic accountability and how can we measure it?’ (1990) 22 
Administration and Society at 283, in R. Mulgan, ‘Accountability: An Ever-Expanding Concept’ (2000) 
78 (3) Public Administration at 567.
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more importantly in securing compliance is the ever present threat of being called to 
account.26
The final extension of accountability as discussed by Mulgan is dialogue, which can 
be present in amnesty arrangements to be discussed later (Chapter 3). 
‘Accountability is seen to be a dialectical activity, requiring officials to answer, explain 
and justify, while those holding them to account engage in questioning, assessing 
and criticizing’.27 Further support for Mulgan’s position comes from March and Olsen 
who place explanation and justification at the core of accountability, which should be 
pursued to provide a contested account.28
Narrative
Accountability has been defined as ‘a liability to reveal, to explain, and to justify what 
one does; how one discharges responsibilities, financial or other, whose several 
origins may be political, constitutional, hierarchical or contractual.’29 In fact the 
provision of a narrative fits in with Mulgan’s ‘final extension of ‘accountability” 30 in 
which he discusses the importance of creating a dialogue.
Scott also focuses on the providing of a narrative and the importance this has on 
accountability. Asserting that the term ‘accountability’ can be broken down into a 
series of questions: specifically, ‘..’who is accountable?’; ‘to whom?’; and ‘for
26 R. Mulgan, ‘Accountability: An Ever-Expanding Concept’ (2000) 78 (3) Public Administration at 567.
27 Ibid at 569
28 J.G. March and J.P. Olsen, Democratic governance (1995) New York: Free Press, Chapter 5, in R. 
Mulgan, ‘Accountability: An Ever-Expanding Concept’ (2000) 78 (3) Public Administration at 569.
29 E.L. Normanton, ‘Public Accountability and Audit: A Reconnaissance’ in Smith and Hague, op. cit., 
n.1, 311, in C. Scott, ‘Accountability in the Regulatory State’ (2000) 27(1) Journal of Law and Society 
at 40.
30 R.Mulgan, ‘Accountability: An Ever-Expanding Concept’ (2000) 78 (3) Public Administration at 569.
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what?’...’31 And through the creation of a dialogue it becomes clear who is being 
called to account, who they are accounting to, and why.
The 'who' part could be a politician, a director of a company, an institution or an 
individual. The ‘accounting to’ part, which Bovens calls the ‘forum’, could be a court, 
government, shareholder or ‘the people’. The ‘why’ part could be required due to 
poor performance, the breaching of responsibility in some way or acting in a way 
which goes against society’s norms.
Separating the ‘to whom’ and ‘for what?’ we find three broad classes within each 
category. Thus accountability may be rendered to a higher authority (‘upwards 
accountability’), to a broadly parallel institution (‘horizontal accountability’) or to lower 
level institutions and groups (such as consumers) (‘downward accountability’).
Whilst Ebrahim’s Article focuses on the work of Non-Governmental Organisations 
and the complex nature of accountability, he describes documents used to provide a 
narrative such as reports and evaluations, as well as participation, as mechanisms of 
accountability.32 Furthermore, Ebrahim distinguishes between the mechanisms as 
either a tool or process.33
Accountability tools refer to devices or techniques, which are often applied over a 
limited period of time and can be documented, for example, the creation and 
submission of financial statements, ledgers or reports to a forum. This links with the
31 C.Scott, ‘Accountability in the Regulatory State’ (2000) 27(1) Journal of Law and Society at 41.
32 A. Ebrahim, ‘Accountability In Practice: Mechanisms for NGOs’ (2003) 31(5) World Development at 
815.
33 Ibid
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discussion on control by Mulgan and the importance of creating a mechanism for 
accountability.34
On the other hand, process mechanisms such as participation and self-regulation 
are generally more broad and multifaceted than tools for achieving accountability. 
Process mechanisms emphasise a course of action rather than a distinct end 
result.35 Ebrahim’s discussion fits well with Scott’s views on the importance of 
providing an account which feeds into a narrative.36
Macro and Micro
With reference to Mulgan’s article in which responsibility aligns with accountability, 
Nollkaemper discusses responsibility in relation to the state and the individual.37 
Nollkaemper jostles with a discussion on macro and micro accountability, which is a 
dichotomy which is perhaps well-suited to international justice and, more specifically, 
post-conflict states.
When addressing a breach of international law, Nollkaemper argues that the 
international community has two options. The first being the pursuit of individual 
responsibility and the second being that of state responsibility.38 This introduces the 
concept of macro and micro accountability.
34 R. Mulgan, ‘Accountability: An Ever-Expanding Concept’ (2000) 78 (3) Public Administration at 566.
35 A. Ebrahim, ‘Accountability In Practice: Mechanisms for NGOs’, (2003) 31(5) World Development 
at 815.
36 Ibid
37A. Nollkaemper, ‘Concurrence Between Individual Responsibility and State Responsibility in 
International Law’ (2003) 52 (3) The International and Comparative Law Quarterly at 615-640.
38 Ibid at 639
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Sanction/punishment
Whilst acknowledging that accountability encroaches upon a plethora of areas 
including, health, education, government, commerce, Rubenstein identifies what she 
calls ‘...the “standard model” of accountability...,’39 which involves holding another 
actor accountable and entails sanctioning that actor if it fails its obligations without a 
justification or excuse.
Rubenstein explores the relationship of ‘power’ with accountability. In a world filled 
with inequality Rubenstein argues that it is unlikely this “standard model” can really 
be achieved in a situation where the less powerful is trying to hold an individual or 
institution to account which is in a stronger and more powerful position. Such power 
imbalances result in the failure to provide what Rubenstein describes as standard 
accountability, so whilst in an ideal world the purest form of accountability is 
preferable, inequalities throughout the world means compromises must be made. 
This ‘standard model’ of accountability is the ideal and one which is extremely 
difficult to achieve, especially when it involves a more powerful actor. Therefore 
comprises are made as to what can realistically be achieved.
According to Behn, some commentators have a clear understanding of what 
accountability means: it means punishment.40 This punishment can be a fine, prison 
sentence, the loss of one’s job, all of which are subject to the requirements of due 
process. In fact:
39 J. Rubenstein, 'Accountability in an Unequal World1 (2007) 69 (3) The Journal of Politics at 616.
40 R.D. Behn, Rethinking democratic accountability (2001) Printed by R.R, Donnelley and Sons, 
Harrisonburg, Virginia at 3, see footnote 14 and 15.
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‘...the punishment can also be the public humiliation of being grilled by a 
hostile legislator, of being sued by an aggressive lawyer, of being 
subpoenaed by an unctuous prosecutor, or of being defamed by an 
investigatory journalist -  none of which requires much due process. When 
people find themselves in a position where they are being held to account, 
there are a variety of ways to hold them accountable to punish them.41
Grant and Keohane claim accountability is concerned with ‘...’standards, information, 
and sanction’...'42 Interestingly not all commentators make reference to the need for 
a sanction or punishment. Whilst some commentators are indignant that sanction is 
a natural facet of accountability, others similar in their views to Behn43, like Bovens44 
and Mulgan45 question whether this actually entails punishment. Sanctioning is 
broader than the imposing of a fine or prison sentence, and in fact, mere judgment 
by a forum (without necessitating the need for punishment), the process of reporting 
and being questioned fits in with the sanction element of accountability. The 
sanctioning is an important part of accountability, but should not be confined to mean 
only a fine or imprisonment.
41 R.D. Behn, Rethinking democratic accountability (2001) Printed by R.R. Donnelley and Sons, 
Harrisonburg, Virginia at 3.
42 R.W. Grant and R.O. Keohane, ‘Accountability and Abuse of Power in World Politics’ (2005) 99(1) 
American Political Science Review 29-44, in J. Rubenstein, 'Accountability in an Unequal World,' 
(2007), 69 (3) The Journal of Politics at 618.
3 R.D. Behn, Rethinking democratic accountability (2001) Printed by R.R. Donnelley and Sons, 
Harrisonburg, Virginia at 3
44 M. Bovens, 'Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework' (2007) 13(4) 
European Law Journal at 451.
45 R. Mulgan, Holding Power to Account: Accountability in Modern Democracies (2003) Pelgrave in 
M. Bovens, 'Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework' (2007) 13(4) 
European Law Journal at 451.
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On the whole there is no predisposition towards punishment within the main 
discourse around accountability, but the recurring focus is on providing a narrative.46 
An explanation for conduct or omissions, thereby explaining and being answerable.
What can be identified when discussing accountability is the dilemma of dealing ‘with 
multiple and sometimes competing accountability demands’.47 This often leads to 
some form of compromise, for example a report or statement which provides an 
account with reasons why someone has made an error, but where there is no call for 
a sanction, thereby working within the basic understanding of accountability of being 
able to explain and answer.
Summary
On the whole, the literature seems primarily concerned with providing a narrative, but 
Rubenstein raises, somewhat vehemently, the importance placed on sanctioning and 
punishing in order to hold someone or some institution accountable.
Revisiting Behn, he observed that the varied definitions of ‘accountability’ in their 
rawest forms ignore the concept of punishment.48 Instead, they emphasise the 
responsibility to answer, to explain, and to justify specific actions (or inactions), in 
part by keeping records of important activities. This seems a stark contrast to some
46 C. Scott, ‘Accountability in the Regulatory State’ (2000) 27(1) Journal of Law and Society 38-60.
47 A. Ebrahim, A. ‘Accountability In Practice: Mechanisms for NGOs’ (2003) 31(5) World Development 
at 814.
48 R.D. Behn, Rethinking democratic accountability (2001) Printed by R.R. Donnelley and Sons, 
Harrisonburg, Virginia at 4.
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international lawyers and scholars who associate holding an individual or institution 
accountable with the sanctioning and punishment through fines or imprisonment.49
According to Moore and Gates ‘the terms of accountability are always changing’.50 
What Mulgan refers to as a ‘chameleon-like term.’51 Lacking clarity and consensus 
as to the definition of accountability has resulted in the term being broad and open to 
manipulation to suit the many contexts in which accountability is sought. However, 
there are a number of key themes which appear within the literature. These include:
Public and Private divide
It is clear ‘accountability’ has both a public and private dimensions; governments, 
institutions and individuals. Generally when someone or something is ‘answering to 
someone or something’ it is to the state, government, people, international 
community (externally, vertically), or, peers, friends, people within the institution or 
community (internally, horizontally).
Narratives
Accountability involves keeping records of events, which in turn provides a useful 
narrative, an account of events.52 The providing of documentation, which Scott 
discusses the keeping of records of events and providing reports explaining what
49 R.D. Behn, Rethinking democratic accountability (2001) Printed by R.R. Donnelley and Sons, 
Harrisonburg, Virginia at 4.
50 Moore and Gates in R.D. Behn, Rethinking democratic accountability (2001) Printed by R.R. 
Donnelley and Sons, Harrisonburg, Virginia at 4.
51 R. Mulgan, ‘Accountability: An Ever-Expanding Concept’ (2000) 78 (3) Public Administration at 555.
52C. Scott, ‘Accountability in the Regulatory State’ (2000) Journal of Law and Society 27(1) at 40.
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has happened, helps add a control aspect to accountability through the provision of a 
narrative.53
Macro and micro
Whilst acknowledging that Rubenstein muddies the water by emphasising the role of 
sanctions and the complexity of power imbalances in the pursuit of both macro and 
micro accountability, it is clear that sanctions do not have to be in the form of fines 
and imprisonment. Sanctions can take many different forms depending on the 
context in which they are imposed.
In acknowledging the common themes within the literature on accountability it 
remains clear that the term remains equivocal rather than univocal. The following 
chapter will discuss accountability and its’ presence within international criminal 
justice and considers who is subject to explain their conduct or omission, to whom 
and why. The challenge for any accountability mechanism is how it can possibly 
deal with competing accountability demands which become even more complex in a 
post-conflict state.
53lbid
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Chapter Two: Accountability in context
The previous chapter discussed the many contexts in which the term accountability 
is used. Accountability becomes ever more complicated in an international criminal 
justice setting since it is contentious in how this can be provided given the 
background of conflicts, which may be longstanding animosities, and the interest that 
the international community takes in restorative justice. This thesis will discuss the 
concept of accountability in the context of post-conflict societies. Concluding with a 
clear statement of what accountability is, and how (best) it is achieved when 
responding to atrocity.
‘Accountability for the most serious crimes is a condition for stability and 
development.’54 Out of the international community following the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo trials borne the idea of, and increased emphasis on, individual accountability. 
Chapter 1 addressed the issue of what accountability is, but this discussion is more 
focused on how it is achieved.
'Accountability measures that achieve justice range from the prosecution of all 
potential violators to the establishment of the truth.'55 With this in mind, this thesis 
will focus on amnesties, truth commissions and formal criminal prosecutions to 
establish the extent to which accountability can be achieved within each mechanism. 
The ascertainment of the truth, to seeking of the justice and providing redress are 
the essential ingredients of dealing with wrong-doing in a post-conflict society.56
54 International Federation for Human Rights, ICC Review Conference: Renewing Commitment to
Accountability May (2010) at 19 last accessed 13/11/12 via: 
http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/KampalaCPI543a.pdf 
M.C. Bassiouni ‘Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for Accountability’ (1996) 
59(4) Law and Contemporary Problems at 19.
56 Ibid
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It is also the case that accountability can be achieved through lustration, truth 
seeking and reparations.57 In fact one of the main issues when addressing 
accountability is separating what people - and by people I mean victims and the 
wider society - want to achieve and how this should be done. Another aspect 
concerns the international community and how these ideas of accountability fit with 
its’ own understanding. Reparations, for example, can be through apologies, 
restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees that history will 
not repeat itself.
International criminal justice systems are set up in post-conflict situations, or 
sometimes even during an on-going conflict. They are often established in respect 
of States in transition where domestic criminal justice may be inadequate due to a 
variety of factors, which include mass scale atrocities committed in the course of 
conflict, the collapse of the domestic legal infrastructure, and/or its inability to 
conduct trials in a fair and open process. When a conflict is still fresh, the domestic 
legal system is often unwilling or unable to address past atrocities.58 This thesis will 
discuss whether perpetrators can be held accountable and whether a formal 
prosecution is required.
A post-conflict society is often in a place of heightened political disorder tasked with 
addressing unhealed wounds. The complexity of such a situation causes conflict 
between possible short-term and long-term goals. Short-term goals revolve around 
the cessation of hostility and establishing a forum for addressing the conflict. Long­
57 Ibid
58
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term goals encompass continued peace and reconciliation within the affected State 
along with regional stability and good constitutional and international order.
The key route to accountability has historically been through individualised criminal 
responsibility’.59 Thereby using criminal trials to provide accountability and in a time 
of heightened awareness on the importance of accountability and the need to end 
impunity, Robinson states that many view 'prosecution is of the highest importance'60 
in providing accountability.61 However, such commentators seek to address human 
rights abuses using the criminal law. The unique and complex nature of dealing with 
atrocity requires a pluralised approach. This means, instead of always reverting to 
law and the use of criminal trials, alternative methods should be used where 
appropriate. Responses to atrocity in a post-conflict society to move beyond the 
dominance of the criminal law as a one size fits all approach and should be context 
specific. Boraine states '[i]t would be regrettable if the only approach to gross human 
rights violations comes in the form of trials and punishment. Every attempt should 
be made to assist countries to find their own solutions provided that there is no 
blatant disregard of fundamental human rights.'62 In fact, supporters of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) and individual accountability have suggested that 
there should be some scope for the ICC to defer to alternatives, such as truth 
commission initiatives, where such initiatives are legitimate and necessary
59 L. Mallinder and K. McEvoy, ‘Rethinking amnesties: atrocity, accountability and impunity in post­
conflict societies’ (2011) 6(1) Contemporary Social Science at 110.
60 D. Robinson, ‘Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the 
International Criminal Court’ (2003) 14(3) European Journal of International Law at 481
61 Ibid at 481-505
62 A. Boraine, A Country Unmasked: South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(2000), in D. Robinson, ‘Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the 
International Criminal Court,’ (2003) 14(3) European Journal of International Law
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mechanisms for a transition from repression or violence to a stable democracy.63 
Issues are raised surrounding what is meant by legitimate and how such initiatives 
could be implemented.
The issue is if, and how, ‘legitimate’ can be distinguished from Boraine’s ‘no blatant 
disregard to fundamental human rights’. Legitimate is concerned with the legal, 
moral and political dimensions which provide a mechanism with legitimacy. On the 
other hand, that might not be easily distinguishable from an amnesty that, while 
domestically and internationally contentious, does not appear to represent a ‘blatant 
disregard for human rights’.
Drumbl discusses the establishment of a norm in how the international community 
seeks to provide accountability for international crimes.64 This norm is what Drumbl 
calls the ‘reflex response of international criminal trials’.65 In this legal context, 
criminal trials fit within this norm as the best forum to address this level of 
wrongdoing. Accountability determinations proceed through adversarial, third party 
adjudication conducted in judicialised settings by putatively neutral judges where the 
individual is constructed as the central figure. This in turn leads to a number of 
select guilty individuals being blamed for systemic levels of violence. When it comes 
to sanction and sentencing the creativity of the response is limited by the criminal 
law, specifically, to imprisonment. Thereby the perpetrator of crimes such as
63 D. Robinson, ‘Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the 
International Criminal Court’ (2003) 14(3) European Journal of International Law at 482.
64 M. Drumbl, Atrocity, punishment, and international criminal law, (2007) Cambridge 
University Press at 205 -209
65 Ibid
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genocide being treated no differently than a perpetrator of armed robbery in those 
countries which adhere to such sentencing models domestically.
Henham’s research focuses on punishment and sentencing in international trials and 
has stated that often the sentences imposed do not reflect the gravity of the crime.66 
Moreover, it would be impossible for the gravity of such heinous crimes to be fully 
reflected in penal policy.
A major concern for Drumbl is that the preference for criminalisation has prompted 
scepticism toward alternative mechanisms in the quest for justice.67 Drumbl calls for 
reform and the expansion of the meaning of justice, and in turn, international criminal 
justice to be pluralised to move beyond the law. Accountability in this somewhat 
rigid legal framework may have a shared value, but pluralism suggests that the 
process of accountability could very well take different forms in different places. 
Drumbl firmly believes there is no one size fits all solution and there should not be 
either because of the complexity of issues and demands placed on a post-conflict 
society.68
In his article, Cleary refers to the general definition of accountability and discusses 
how the term can be divided into someone being answerable for their conduct and 
being able to explain their actions. Cleary makes a bold, but true statement in that 
‘we are all accountable.’69
66 R. Henham, 'Some Issues for Sentencing in the International Criminal Court (2003) 52 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 81 -114.
67 M. Drumbl, M. Atrocity, punishment, and international criminal law, (2007) Cambridge 
University Press at 209.
68 Ibid
69 E.J. Cleary, ‘Accountability,’ (2002) 59 Bench & Bar of Minnesota at 6.
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The shift towards individual accountability in international criminal justice can be 
traced back to the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials following the Second World War. 
‘Never again’, were the words uttered, would this happen, whilst the trials sought to 
hold the most senior perpetrators accountable. The trials provided a model which 
combined adversarial trial with inquisitorial pre-trial submissions. An adapted 
version of this model was used as a template for the Ad Hoc Tribunals in the Former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The merit of the model is forensic engagement with 
evidence in order to provide a fair trial; the downside is the length of trials and a 
seeming detachment from restorative practices, which is the viewpoint of many 
commentators including Drumbl,70 Mallinder and McEvoy.71
Whilst ‘...there is an increasing recognition of accountability as a norm in 
international law’72 the international community generally relies upon five alternative 
ways of responding to atrocity. Firstly, the international community may do nothing, 
perhaps on political grounds, which is surely the antithesis of providing 
accountability. Second, grant amnesty, which according to Scharf can provide a 
short-term answer to settling conflicts and a mechanism the international community 
can utilise or allow a state to use for the cessation of hostility facilitating the transition 
to democracy.73 An example provided by Scharf is the mass murder of civilians by 
military leaders in Haiti. The military leaders were persuaded to step down from
70 Drumbl, M. Atrocity, punishment, and international criminal law, (2007) Cambridge 
University Press.
71 Mallinder, L. and McEvoy, K. ‘Rethinking amnesties: atrocity, accountability and impunity in post­
conflict societies’, (2011) 6(1) Contemporary Social Science 107-128.
72 M.C. Bassiouni, ‘Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for Accountability,’ (1996) 
59(4) Law and Contemporary Problems at 19.
73 Scharf, M.P, ‘Responding to Rwanda: Accountability Mechanisms in the Aftermath of Genocide’ 
(1999) 52(2) Journal of International Affairs at 624.
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power to allow a democratically elected government take office, which was facilitated 
by the United Nations and was the 'only valid framework for the solution of the crisis 
in Haiti'.74 Scharf also observed, ‘[i]n the short run, the amnesty achieved more for 
the restoration of human rights in Haiti than what would have resulted by insisting on 
punishment and risking political instability’, 75 thereby illustrating the potential 
usefulness of amnesties.
Third, the international community may seek to establish a truth commission (also 
called a truth and reconciliation commission, as in South Africa. Fourth, the 
international community may assist domestic prosecutions, through funding or help 
with resources. Fifth, to pursue the investigation and prosecution of alleged 
perpetrators within an international arena.76 Often the decision rests on the political 
motivations at the time. Scharf provides an example and states that ‘Cold War 
politics’77 were to blame for the lack of engagement in Cambodia, at the time, and 
immediately following the conflict where it is estimated ‘two million people were 
butchered.’ 78 Whilst Scharf criticises the international community’s lack of 
immediacy in their responses to atrocity and cites Cambodia’s killing fields as an 
example.79
The varied responses from the international community highlight the multi-faceted 
dimension of accountability. Mendez states accountability ‘...has legal, ethical, and
74 Statement of the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/INF/49 (New York: United Nations, 
November 1994, in Scharf, M.P, ‘Responding to Rwanda: Accountability Mechanisms in the Aftermath 
of Genocide’ (1999) 52(2) Journal of International Affairs at 624.
75 M.P. Scharf, ‘Responding to Rwanda: Accountability Mechanisms in the Aftermath of Genocide,’
(1999) 52(2) Journal of International Affairs at 624.
Ibid at 622
77 Ibid at 621
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political dimensions, and it is imperative to recognize and tackle all three.’ 80 
Moreover, Mendez asserts much of the discussion takes place in the context of 
transitional justice, but should also be seen to provide a solution to conflict. ‘Ending 
conflict situations presents political challenges to accountability issues that are not 
present in transitions to democracy.’81
Expectations and the tension with reality
Rather poignantly, Bassiouni states that 'no single formula can apply to all types of 
conflicts nor can it achieve all desired outcomes.'82 Suggesting a variety of 
mechanisms should be used to provide accountability depending on the context in 
which it is being sought. Bassiouni is also stating a cautionary tale of what such 
mechanisms can realistically achieve. It may not be possible to achieve the 
standard model of accountability.
Accountability has a number of dimensions, specifically, legal, ethical and political.83 
Additionally, States are under an obligation to hold perpetrators to account for the 
sake of victims and the wider society.84 This seemingly stems from the human rights 
movement that has created two positions: legalistic and moralistic positions. There 
is a tendency for international criminal justice to take a legalistic view under the 
auspices that it touches upon both the ethical and political dimensions and by doing 
so adopts a top down approach when dealing with atrocity.85 Doak observes that
80 J.E. Mendez, ‘Accountability for Past Abuses’ (1997) 19 Human Rights Quarterly at 256.
81 Ibid at 257
82 M.C. Bassiouni, ‘Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for Accountability,’ (1996) 
59(4) Law and Contemporary Problems at 23.
83 J.E. Mendez, 'Accountability for Past Abuses,1 (1997) 19 (2) Human Rights Quarterly at 256.
84 Ibid
85 Ibid at 257.
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international justice focuses predominantly on retribution, which means it falls short 
in achieving restorative elements.86
States have a number of choices available: either the state adopts a punitive stance 
and pursues formal criminal trials or decides to adopt less punitive means, for 
example, a truth commission. However, such mechanisms are not mutually 
exclusive.87
Truth
Truth is the cornerstone of the rule of law, and it will point towards individuals, 
not peoples, as perpetrators of war crimes. And it is only the truth that can 
cleanse the ethnic and religious hatreds and begin the healing process’.88
There is an increasing amount of commentary within the international fora around 
the importance of truth and the role it plays in the aftermath of atrocity and its 
significance in providing accountability. Victims, their loved ones and the wider 
society are entitled to the ‘truth’ and an increased emphasis on truth-telling as a 
means of providing a historical record and the addressing of past wrongdoing. This 
emphasis perhaps originates from the increasing credence provided to transitional 
justice. It seems ‘truth’ can provide reconciliation and enable a state to start a new 
chapter by providing answers and moving on. Indeed, any mechanism for
86 J. Doak, The Therapeutic Dimension of Transitional Justice: Emotional Repair and Victim 
Satisfaction in International Trials and Truth Commissions’, (2011) 11 International Criminal Law 
Review 263-298.
87 J.E. Mendez, 'Accountability for Past Abuses,1 (1997) 19 (2) Human Rights Quarterly at 255-282.
88 UN Doc. S/RES/827, 25 May 1993, Record on Debate of Resolution 827, published in V. Morris 
and M. Scharf, An Insider’s Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, A 
Documentary History and Analysis, (1995) (Volume 2 Transnational Publishers 185 (Ms Albright, 
United States of America).
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accountability which fails to provide truth should be perhaps considered mere 
tokenism. Moreover, Zalaquett stated truth is a requirement for legitimacy and 
provides for the establishment of the facts thereby holding someone to account.89
Krauthammer argued that ‘truth is always preferable to justice’.90 This suggests a 
compromise may have to be reached, but through the process of ascertaining the 
truth, it in turn, satisfies elements of justice. It is a precondition of legitimacy that any 
process of accountability should include truth telling.91 In fact, a trial without truth 
telling violates due process equating justice with equal participation, as a party and 
witness.
‘One of the primary means to find closure and overcome trauma and anxiety is 
through account-making’.92 This requires the creation of a narrative concerning the 
atrocity, which will require all parties engaging in a process of truth telling and leads 
to the writing of an accurate narrative. This process and provision of a narrative 
perhaps links the process of truth ascertainment with justice.
‘It is sometimes asserted that for victims of crime and serious human rights 
violations, storytelling -  whilst usually a painful process -  can be valuable and 
empowering in the longer term by helping restore a sense of esteem and self-
89 J. Zalaquett, Dealing with the Past: Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa, 51 Alex Boraine et al. 
eds., (1994) in J.E. Mendez, ‘Accountability for Past Abuses’ (1997) 19 Human Rights Quarterly at 
268.
90 J.E. Mendez, ‘Accountability for Past Abuses’, (1997) 19 Human Rights Quarterly at 268.
91 J. Zalaquett, Dealing with the Past: Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa, 51 Alex Boraine et al. 
eds., (1994) in J.E. Mendez, ‘Accountability for Past Abuses’ (1997) 19 Human Rights Quarterly at 
268.
92 J. Doak, The Therapeutic Dimension of Transitional Justice: Emotional Repair and Victim 
Satisfaction in International Trials and Truth Commissions’ (2011) 11 International Criminal Law 
Review at 269.
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worth’.93 In the short-term this could perhaps re-traumatise victims and/or their 
families, but is important for the process of reconciliation.
The increased significance of truth commissions within a post-conflict state as a 
means of addressing past wrongdoing has led to the importance of truth and the role 
it plays in providing accountability. Truth can achieve accountability and promote 
justice by imposing moral condemnation and offering specific recommendations for 
reform. Mendez raised concerns with the arguments articulated by commentators 
such as Krauthammer, Pastor and Forsythe as he asserts they are proponents of 
trading justice for truth. Such commentators argue the ‘trading’ of justice is needed 
because they confine justice to mean the prosecution and subsequent punishment of 
perpetrators, but justice in the context of a post-conflict society is much broader than 
equating wrong-doing to punishment. Indeed, ‘...the public expects the truth telling 
to be a step in the direction of accountability, not a poor alternative to it.’94 Whilst not 
requiring punishment it perhaps requires lustration. Lustration is concerned with the 
removal of politicians who have been complicit in international crimes.95 This 
process can effectively remove corrupt individuals from positions of power and 
influence as a form of punishment.
Understanding the importance of truth requires an appreciation of the quality of the 
truth that is to be uncovered. In fact ‘...what will be the quality of the truth that is 
established? Will one be forced to make negative comparisons between the
93 J. Doak, The Therapeutic Dimension of Transitional Justice: Emotional Repair and Victim 
Satisfaction in International Trials and Truth Commissions’ (2011) 11 International Criminal Law 
Review at 270.
94 J.E. Mendez, ‘Accountability for Past Abuses' (1997) 19 Human Rights Quarterly at 269.
95 R. Cryer, H. Friman, D. Robinson and E. Wilmshurst, An Introduction to International Criminal Law 
and Procedure (2010) Cambridge University Press at 575.
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commission’s truth and judicial truth or historical truth?’ 96 Discussion around 
establishing the truth within a truth commission and a trial will be discussed in later 
chapters, but as a starting point it is important to recognise that truth commissions 
provide a forum for the truth to be told and an opportunity for victims, families and 
witnesses to state their account of events. Whilst there is criticism regarding the full 
extent of the truth achieved through a trial, Mendez states truth ‘established has a 
“tested” quality that makes it all the more persuasive.’97
Teitel's view is that '[i]t is sufficient that a few well-published trials are held at which 
the "truth" of the past is demonstrated, the victims' voices are heard and the moral 
principles of the (new) community are affirmed.'98 No matter how detailed these 
limited number of case reports are, they are unlikely to provide a full, and truthful, 
account. They may help provide a background, but often in trials, defendants will 
only reveal that which has already been uncovered. A fully truthful account is 
unlikely where it is likely to worsen the situation for the defendant. It is also unlikely 
that all the victims of atrocity will have their day in court for practical purposes.
A number of commentators fail to appreciate the complexity of dealing with a post­
conflict society and the important role ‘truth’ plays, but Sooka discusses 
reconciliation in her article on accountability and argues that in order to reconcile a 
state the process requires support from members within the affected society, factual
96 A. Perreira, ‘South Africa’s Road to Healing Paved with Problems’ in LEXIS News Library, 
CURNWS File (11 April 1996) in M.P. Scharf, ‘Responding to Rwanda: Accountability Mechanisms in 
the Aftermath of Genocide,’ (1999) 52(2) Journal of International Affairs at 627.
97 J.E. Mendez, ‘Accountability for Past Abuses’ (1997) 19 Human Rights Quarterly at 278.
98 R.G.Teitel, Transitional Justice (2000) Oxford University Press at 51-59 in M. Koskenniemi, 
'Between Impunity and Show Trials' (2002) 6 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 1 -35.
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knowledge and an acknowledgement of past wrongdoing. 99 Therefore 
demonstrating the significant role 'truth' plays in the process of reconciliation, but 
also in relation to providing answers and explanations.
Whilst it is acknowledged that truth is an essential part of providing accountability, 
there is an issue with ‘plurality of truths’ or whether ‘one shared truth’ needs to be 
reached. Any mechanism to provide accountability will include some route to the 
truth. The issue is determining the best way to establish an accurate, a truthful, 
account of the conflict. There are inevitably competing narratives generated by 
conflict, and truth commissions allow them to be heard without necessarily 
reconciling them. Prosecutions do sometimes attempt to make an authorised 
narrative but they are instrumental too as truths are necessary for prosecutions. 
Amnesties have the potential to allow peace, which can be a precondition, certainly 
for conditional amnesties (Chapter 3), of an open and honest debate which feed into 
the provision of a narrative.
The only possible truth that would have legitimacy and be acknowledged as accurate 
is one that is produced with the involvement of all parties. The end result would then 
reflect a ‘collective truth’, however, this is subject to the assumption that participants 
in the process have fully disclosed their involvement and have provided an accurate 
account. There is also a requirement the 'truth' is obtained through a transparent 
process, which treats all voices equally.
99 Y. Sooka, ‘Dealing with the past and transitional justice: building peace through accountability’ 
(2006) 88(862) International Review of the Red Cross 311-325.
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Justice
‘In examining accountability, one confronts a moral imperative for punishment, 
deterrence, and some form of healing for victims; a legal landscape lacking 
any comprehensive criminal code and enforcement architecture; and a 
political environment in which governments and domestic constituencies have 
sharply differing ideas of both the definition of justice and the costs of 
administering it to all offenders.’100
The word ‘justice’ is a difficult one to define, especially in an international context, 
with the varied cultures and understandings of what is meant by the term and how it 
can, and should be, achieved. Is justice achieved through a punitive approach, the 
arrest, charge, prosecution and conviction of perpetrators? This may provide justice 
for individual victims and their family, but in a post-conflict society it is also important 
to provide justice for the wider community.
Clark argues ‘...justice entails far more than simply retribution’.101 Therefore, justice 
is something which cannot be satisfied purely through a criminal trial.102 Slye seeks 
to determine how justice is achieved. Justice is providing victims with truth, a right to 
judicial protection and reparations.103 Perhaps a restorative amnesty, which is a 
conditional amnesty sitting within a transitional context would fit within this 
framework.
100 S.R. Ratner, J.S. Abrams and J.L. Bischoff, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in 
International Law: Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy, (2009) 3rd Edition, Oxford University Press at 2.
101 J.N. Clark, ‘Peace, Justice and the International Criminal Court: Limitations and Possibilities’ 
(2011) 9 Journal of International Criminal Justice at 521.
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103 R.C. Slye, The Legitimacy of Amnesties Under International Law and General Principles of Anglo- 
American Law: Is a Legitimate Amnesty Possible?’ (2002) 43 Virginia Journal of International Law 
Association at 173.
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The Peace and justice debate often confines justice as a legalistic concept. 
However, the literature is increasingly acknowledging that justice is needed before 
peace can become a reality.104 For example, Clark states ‘...the ICTY is essentially 
an instrument of peace: the criminal prosecution of persons responsible for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law is regarded as being central to the peace 
process in the former Yugoslavia’.105
According to Mendez, it is important for the international community to see justice is 
done.106 In fact '[tjhe pursuit of justice and accountability fulfils fundamental human 
needs and expresses key values necessary for the prevention and deterrence of 
future conflicts'.107 This returns to the very heart of justice, what it means, and how it 
is achieved, thereby focusing on substantive justice (the best outcome) with 
procedural justice (the best process).
Justice also requires reconciliation as it:
‘is critical to the construction and maintenance of peace. Reconciliation in 
this context does not mean that victims must forgive their wrongdoers, or that
104 J.N. Clark, ‘Peace, Justice and the International Criminal Court: Limitations and Possibilities’ 
(2011) 9 Journal of International Criminal Justice at 539
05 G.T. Blewitt, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Yugoslavia and Rwanda’, in M. Lattimer 
and P. Sands, (eds), Justice for Crimes Against Humanity (2006) Oxford: Hart Publishing 145-160, at 
146. in J.N. Clark, ‘Peace, Justice and the International Criminal Court: Limitations and Possibilities’ 
(2011) 9 Journal of International Criminal Justice at 539.
06 J.E. Mendez, ‘Accountability for Past Abuses’ (1997) 19 Human Rights Quarterly at 270.
107 M.C. Bassiouni, 'Justice and Peace: The Importance of Choosing Accountability Over Realpolitik1 
(2003) 35 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law at 192.
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victims and offenders must enjoy friendly relations, but it does require that 
hostilities be defused and that citizens find a way of peacefully coexisting’.108
The restoration of democratic processes and the provision of social and political 
stability is a precondition of accountability. Establishing the rule of law will involve 
institution building as well as political transformation and establishment of good 
governance. The term ‘governance’ is being used as a collective term which focuses 
on a number of concepts. These include reconciliation and reparation within a state 
following a period of conflict and the political transition to be undertaken. It is 
important to note that the risk of atrocity occurring is heightened 'when countries are 
in upheaval and/or the political conditions are unstable.'109
The role states themselves play in the process is also important. It also creates 
dynamics within which accountability plays an important role. States are often 
aggressors themselves and commit atrocity110 thereby, acting as a catalyst for a 
culture of impunity. The United Nations has developed four ‘rule of law’ indicators to 
assist states recovering from a period of conflict.111 The rationale behind the 
indicators is that the establishment of rule of law is an essential aspect of 
governance and is required to build an effective criminal justice system.
108 D. Roche, Truth Commission Amnesties and the International Criminal Court1 (2005) 45 British 
Journal of Criminology at 573.
109C.C. Joyner 'Arresting Impunity: The Case for Universal Jurisdiction in Bringing War Criminals to 
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110 M.C. Bassiouni, 'Justice and Peace: The Importance of Choosing Accountability Over Realpolitik' 
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The United Nation’s Four Rule of Law Indicators accessed via: 
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To facilitate transition following a period of conflict, it requires what Sooka calls, the 
'ownership of the process.1112 It falls to the government to implement any 
mechanism being used to hold perpetrators accountable. It is also important for 
whichever path to accountability is pursued that civilians participate in order for 
democracy to prevail.
Ensuring public participation within a democratic process will provide an institution 
with legitimacy. In fact, the issue of accountability is not only concerned with holding 
perpetrators accountable, but also the mechanism/institution established to provide 
accountability.113
‘One must take a sober and realistic view of political constraints in proposing
accountability measures.’114 However, this does not automatically result in realpolitik 
and surrender of accountability. In fact, it is possible to argue that the pursuance of 
truth and justice is not only the right thing to do, but also politically desirable because 
it goes a long way toward realizing the idea of democracy.
Koskenniemi discusses the expectations of victims and poignantly states that victims 
‘do not so much expect punishment (though of course that is not insignificant) but 
rather a recognition of the fact that what they were made to suffer was “wrong”, and 
that their moral grandeur is symbolically affirmed.’115 This does not only satisfy the
112 Y. Sooka, ‘Dealing with the past and transitional justice: building peace through accountability’ 
88(862) International Review of the Red Cross at 314.
J.E. Mendez, ‘Accountability for Past Abuses’ (1997) 19 Human Rights Quarterly at 256.
115 M. Koskenniemi, ‘Beyond Impunity and Show Trials’ (2002) 6(1) Max Planck Yearbook of 
International Law at 11, in C. McCarthy, ‘Victim Redress and International Criminal Justice: 
Competing Paradigms, or Compatible Forms of Justice?’ (2012) Journal of International Criminal 
Justice at 371.
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need to answer and explain for individual conduct, but through this process the 
victims and wider community are acknowledged.
Recognition
Maintaining the focus on being able to explain conduct and provide answers the final 
addition to this chapter is recognition. Martineau et al discuss the theories of 
recognition and based on Taylor’s publication state that ‘...recognition is not just a 
courtesy we owe people, but ‘a vital human need’.116
The term “recognition” may be said to be comprised of two quite distinct acts: a 
political act and a legal act’.117 Whilst in his article Kelsen uses his understanding of 
recognition in relation to states, it also provides a good starting point for the 
recognition of grave wrongdoing of international crimes.118
Recognition has at least two dimensions which are political and legal. Political 
nature of recognition is concerned with story-telling and the creation of a narrative as 
well as recognising an individual’s status as a victim who has a right to be heard and 
participate, even if the victim is not owed a conviction. Legal recognition can be 
provided through criminal trials and the acknowledgement of crimes and victims by a 
court. It is also possible to provide legal recognition through the use of alternative 
mechanisms, which provide opportunities to acknowledge the wrong-doing. As well
116 C. Taylor, The Politics of recognition. In Multiculturalism and the politics of recognition, ed. A. 
Gutmann, (1994) at 25-73. Princeton: Princeton University Press, in W. Martineau, N. Meer and S. 
Thompson, Theory and Practice in the Politics of Recognition and Misrecognition’ (2012) 18 Res 
Publica 1-9.
117 H. Kelsen, ‘Recognition in International Law: Theoretical Observations’ (1941) 35(4) The American 
Journal of International Law at 605.
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as the criminal law, it is also possible to provide redress and recognition through the 
use of civil courts.
In her Article, McCarthy observes the inherent predisposition of international criminal 
justice with prosecuting and punishing perpetrators of international crimes and in so 
doing fails to provide the necessary redress for victims.119 Recognition goes 
someway to address this issue.
For the purposes of this discussion, recognition in an international criminal justice 
context can be divided into three distinct sub-categories. These include reparation, 
participation and stabilisation through the rule of law. Recognition in the context of a 
post-conflict society is concerned with the re-establishment of people as citizens.
The very nature of the types of conflict that fall within the clutches of international 
criminal justice means that there will be large numbers of both perpetrators and 
victims. The broader issue is whether accountability should focus on the 
perpetrators of crimes, but with the sheer number of individuals to be held 
accountable, and the devastation caused by the conflict, this seems an 
insurmountable task.
The importance of reparation also burdens and tests the political might of a new 
government. As stated 'a well-designed reparations program contributes to justice 
precisley because reparations constitute a form of recognition...'120
119 C. McCarthy, ‘Victim Redress and International Criminal Justice: Competing Paradigms, or 
Compatible Forms of Justice?’ (2012) 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice 351 -372.
120 P. de Grieff, 'Reparations Efforts in International Perspective: What Compensation Contributes to 
the achievement of Imperfect Justice,1 (unpublished paper) at 34 in Sooka, Y. ‘Dealing with the past
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'Victims need to have their victimisation acknowledged, the wrongs committed 
against them decried, and the criminal perpetrators, or at least their leaders, 
punished, and compensation provided for the survivors'.121 This acknowledgement 
may also be associated through the provision of reparations, as Bassiouni states, 
'victim compensation is a necessity'.122 While acknowledging that compensation 
does not necessarily have to be monetary, any form of compensation would fall 
within the recognition subheading. In order for victims to be compensated, victims 
will need to be acknowledged and thereby recognised by a court or some other entity 
as being victims of the atrocity.
Recognition encompasses various actors, the State (Government), the wider society, 
individual victims and of groups on the grounds of ethnicity, race, religion or gender.. 
However, it is questionable as to the extent to which all three actors can benefit from 
recognition. Mechanisms designed to provide redress and recognition would 
perhaps provide a domino effect. Recognition through political participation is 
extremely important and plays a significant role in the wider restorative process.
The political aspect is hugely important as well as the process of lustration. It is vital 
for a state to move through a difficult transitional period with a view to restoring its’ 
community and maintaining peace that, for example, the new Government 
acknowledges past wrongdoing. Again, this may not necessarily be through criminal 
trials, but through lustration or establishing a process or mechanism to recognise
and transitional justice: building peace through accountability,’ (2006) 88(862) International Review of 
the Red Cross at 320.
121M.C. Bassiouni, ‘Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for Accountability,’ (1996) 
59(4) Law and Contemporary Problems at 26.
122 Ibid at 22
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and acknowledge the past. This creates another dimension of recognition, which 
does rely on the law.
Overall, atrocity has a number of key stakeholders: victims, perpetrators, the state 
and the international community. Whether a prosecution, truth commission or 
national amnesty is implemented, or a combination of these to address atrocity, they 
are tasked with resolving often deep rooted hostility with an abundance of 
complexity.
Summary
The discussion so far has established that accountability has many dimensions and 
meanings. In its’ rawest form, accountability means to answer and explain. This 
chapter has asserted that, in an international criminal justice context, three 
fundamental requirements need to be satisfied to provide accountability: truth, justice 
and recognition. In the forthcoming chapters, the discussion will develop these three 
requirements in the context of amnesties, truth commissions and prosecutions.
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Chapter Three: Amnesties: the antithesis of accountability?
The origin and complexity of conflict provides a State with extraordinary challenges 
in respect of moving forward after a period of sustained conflict. The broader 
question is whether or not alternatives, such as amnesties can facilitate such periods 
of transition. Amnesties are inherently political and have been used to both help 
cease hostility and in post-conflict societies. This chapter explores the political 
nature of amnesties, but limits itself to the discussion of conditional amnesties (see 
below), not blanket amnesties.
Amnesty is the promise of suspending criminal and civil justice measures and 
ignoring certain crimes, for utilitarian purposes. Ergo, on strictly consequentialist and 
mathematical grounds (i.e. the greatest happiness for the greatest number), 
amnesties often have strong moral justification. This can be contrasted with the 
other major theory of morality, deonology, which would dictate that there is a duty to 
respond to wrongdoing with a punitive response regardless of its (dis)utility.
An amnesty, like ‘amnesia’, comes from the Greek word ‘amnestia’, meaning 
‘forgetfulness’ or ‘oblivion’. From a legal perspective, amnesty laws have 
traditionally been understood as extraordinary legal measures designed to eliminate 
the record of past crimes by barring criminal prosecutions and/or civil suits for 
designated persons or crimes.123 In this context, amnesties seem to be the 
antithesis of accountability. As discussed in Chapter 2, accountability in the 
dominant legalised context requires prosecution and punishment. Moving beyond
123 Defining Amnesty Laws, Queen’s University Website, last accessed 12 November 2012 at:
http://www.aub.ac.uk/schools/SchoolofLaw/Research/lnstituteofCriminoloavandCriminalJustice/Resea
rch/BevondLeqalism/DefininaAmnestvLaws/
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this definition it is important to understand amnesties in context to fully appreciate 
the appropriateness of such a mechanism.
Many commentators argue that amnesty falls short of providing accountability. As 
will be explored, it is possible for some amnesties, such as conditional amnesties to 
provide truth, stabilisation and end the cycle of conflict.
Amnesties have long served as a response to atrocity in both conflict ridden and 
post-conflict states.124 Whilst some controversial unconditional amnesties, also 
referred to as blanket amnesties, which have dominated literature and been fuel for 
the fire for critiques of amnesty laws.125 Unconditional amnesties were often granted 
automatically and unconditionally to specified groups of offenders. The amnesty 
would simply require the police and prosecutors to refrain from investigating and 
prosecuting crimes which fall within the remit of the amnesty.
According to Mallinder and McEvoy, who have undertaken empirical research into 
the use of amnesties, implementation processes can take many forms.126 One form 
includes the use of national courts who decide whether or not the defendant is 
eligible for the amnesty. Where the court decides an amnesty should be granted to 
an individual the case is closed.127
There are also conditional amnesties, amnesties for which implementation 
processes are put in place thereby making the amnesty limited and conditional.
124 L. Mallinder and K. McEvoy ‘Rethinking amnesties: atrocity, accountability and impunity in post­
conflict societies,’ (2011) 6(1) Contemporary Social Science at 120
125 Ibid
Mallinder and McEvoy state the implementation process for conditional amnesties 
‘must be established to determine who is eligible for amnesty’.128
Advisory bodies report back to the executive following a period of investigations and 
submit a list of people for whom they recommend that amnesty is granted.129 It is 
then at the discretion of the head of state whether or not to grant amnesty in 
accordance with the recommendations.
Some amnesty processes provide for the creation of an amnesty commission, which 
can be government bodies as in Uganda, or can be independent entities as in South 
Africa. Dependent on their mandates, amnesty commissions can grant or 
recommend amnesty which can be on the basis of certain individuals or groups, as 
well as for particular crimes committed within a certain period.130
In addition to the issues raised by individual accountability, these processes 
themselves are also subject to a form of accountability. The decision to grant 
amnesty must be in accordance with the amnesty law and as a consequence the 
decision needs to explain the rationale behind granting an amnesty. In fact, it is 
important the decision makers explain the decision to grant amnesty to adhere to a 
fair and transparent process. Of course decisions of this nature are subject to 
scrutiny from victims themselves, support groups, the media and scholars.131
129J. Sarkin, Carrots and sticks: The TRC and the South African amnesty process (2004) Antwerp, 
Intersentia, in L. Mallinder and K. McEvoy, ‘Rethinking amnesties: atrocity, accountability and 
impunity in post-conflict societies,’ (2011) 6(1) Contemporary Social Science at 120.
130 L. Mallinder and K. McEvoy ‘Rethinking amnesties: atrocity, accountability and impunity in post­
conflict societies’ (2011) 6(1) Contemporary Social Science at 120.
131 Ibid at 121
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Decisions to grant amnesty have a wider impact on the community as a whole. 
Individuals granted amnesty may well have difficulty in reintegrating within a society, 
which will likely contain victims or their families, thereby creating further 
complications for reconciliation.132 As part of its remit, the commission may also play 
a role in this important reintegration process.133 This also provides victims with the 
opportunity to challenge decisions made before a court.134
The controversy surrounding amnesties has increased with the improved awareness 
of human rights issues and recognition of international criminal law. In this legal 
context which equates accountability with prosecution and punishment, amnesties 
are viewed as allowing impunity. However, the broadening of accountability beyond 
this legal context and referring back to the broader contexts of accountability, as 
mentioned in Chapter One, affords certain amnesties with an opportunity to provide 
accountability. As Bovens has argued, accountability has come to serve as a term 
which covers various distinct ideas such as ‘transparency, equity, democracy, 
efficiency, responsiveness, responsibility and integrity.’135
The determination to hold individuals accountable during what can only be described 
as a delicate transition from conflict or a dictatorship to a new regime requires a 
broader interpretation of accountability. Focusing on accountability in a broader
Ibid at 120
134lbid at 121
135 M. Bovens, ‘Analysing and assessing accountability: a conceptual framework’ (2007) 13(4) 
European Law Journal at 449.
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sense will allow ‘amnesties to play a more constructive role in post-conflict justice 
and peacemaking’.136
‘Sometimes [amnesty] may simply be an unavoidable political reality, dictated 
by the need to bring an end to conflict. To be sure, many amnesties given to 
tyrants in recent decades are vulnerable to severe criticism. But it is too 
absolute to rule them out altogether.’137
The political nature of amnesties cannot be understated. In fact, Mallinder states 
‘[a]mnesty laws have a long history of being used as political tools to stem violent 
conflict or facilitate negotiated transitions’.138 The political usefulness of amnesties 
does not necessarily lie within truth and justice, but in the potential stabilisation of a 
state. As previously discussed, full accountability for atrocity can rarely be achieved.
There have been two important developments in international law that have caused 
many to question the use of amnesties. Firstly, the international community has 
recently established that it will hold at least some violators of international law 
accountable for their actions. This is evidenced by the United Nations’ (UN) creation 
of the international war crimes tribunals, with the sole purpose of prosecuting 
perpetrators of crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 
Subsequently, the UN has set up a special court in Sierra Leone. More recently, the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) has been established and designed to prosecute
136 L. Mallinder and K. McEvoy, ‘Rethinking amnesties: atrocity, accountability and impunity in post­
conflict societies’ (2012) 6(1) Contemporary Social Science at 109.
137 Final Report of the Truth & Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, Vol. 1, ch 1, para 79, L. 
Mallinder, The Role of Amnesties in Conflict Transformation’ in The Effectiveness of International 
Criminal Justice, Cedric Ryngaert (ed.), International Law, Volume 3, August, £009 at p.280.
138 Ibid.
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crimes under international law.139 In light of these developments many world 
leaders, international lawyers and human rights activists now believe it is not 
acceptable to allow perpetrators of atrocity to go unpunished. Prosecution and 
punishment, they argue, is essential to eliminate the notion of impunity and to deter 
current and future leaders from committing similar crimes.140 This assumes the use 
of criminal law is capable of carrying out prosecutions and acts as a deterrent.
Despite the increasing recognition of fundamental human rights and the 
accompanying demand to bring perpetrators to justice, governments in post-conflict 
states struggle to determine the best way to deal with past wrongdoing. We have 
seen the leaders in Peru, Argentina, Chile, Haiti, Sierra Leone and South Africa, to 
name a few, have passed blanket amnesty laws that protect perpetrators who have 
committed serious violations of international law from prosecution. The decision to 
grant amnesty often results from a combination of several considerations. Some 
countries are ill-equipped to prosecute these criminals, especially when the atrocity 
occurred on a large scale or a number of years ago. Governments may see an 
amnesty as necessary to halt the human rights abuses, believing guerrilla groups or 
entrenched dictators may naturally be reluctant to cease hostilities or relinquish 
power if they know that they will face prosecution thereafter.141 Governments may 
also fear that large scale prosecutions would undermine the process of 
reconciliation, and that the government can better serve the country’s immediate 
needs by focusing on restoring order, rebuilding infrastructure, and implementing 
democratic reforms.
139 Preamble of the Rome Statute 1998
140 Ibid
141 W.A. Schabas, ‘Amnesty, the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special 
Court of Sierra Leone,’ (2004) 11 U.C. Davis Journal of International Law & Policy 145,164.
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Thus, the legality of amnesties for perpetrators of crimes under international criminal 
law is in a state of transition and considerable uncertainty. On one hand, scholars, 
lawyers, and governmental officials argue that customary international law prohibits 
amnesties and requires states to seek justice for serious human rights violations.142 
Further, they argue that the international community has an interest in seeking 
retribution and deterring future human rights violations. Thus, they assert that 
domestic amnesties do not prevent international tribunals or national courts in other 
states from asserting jurisdiction over these criminals. On the other hand, the fact 
that governments continue to offer amnesties suggests that customary international 
law does not, at least yet, prohibit certain amnesty laws.143
Despite the uncertainty over the de jure legality of amnesties, many commentators 
agree that the international community can de facto legitimise an amnesty. The UN 
has participated in amnesty negotiations and has approved such deals after they 
were concluded.144 Likewise, the International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor has 
discretion to not prosecute certain criminals where ‘a prosecution is not in the 
interests of justice’.145 The need for the international community to reach consensus 
on the validity of amnesties has become more important in light of the controversial 
amnesties adopted by several countries.146 In 2005, both Algeria and Colombia 
enacted amnesties intended to bring years of civil war to an end. In Algeria, the
142 D. Orentlicher, ‘Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior 
Regime,’ (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 2585-93.
143 M.P. Scharf, 'Swapping Amnesties for Peace: Was There a Duty to Prosecute International Crimes 
in Haiti?’ (1998) 31 (1) Texas International Law Journal at 36.
144 Ibid
145 Rome Statute 1998, Section 53(2)(c).
146 M. Slackman, ‘But Bygones Can’t Be Bygones If The Pain is Raw’ New York Times 5th October 
2005, at A4.
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Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation provides amnesty to all militants not 
accused of public bombings, mass murder, and rape. The Charter also provides 
monetary reparations to the victims of the fifteen year civil war. In Columbia, the 
Justice and Peace Law grants amnesty to paramilitaries and leftist guerrillas who 
turn themselves in, and provides limited sentences of 5-7 years for those who 
committed serious crimes under international law. In 2005, the President of 
Columbia, Alvaro Uribe, visited world leaders in the hope of securing international 
approval of the deal. However, human rights organizations criticized the law for 
perpetuating an atmosphere of impunity in Cambodia, and have called upon the ICC 
to ignore the amnesty and prosecute the leaders of the guerrilla and paramilitary
147groups.
An international duty to prosecute serious crimes under international law could arise 
from one of two sources of international law: treaty or custom. A state may accept 
such a duty by becoming a party to a treaty that explicitly requires signatory states to 
prosecute certain types of crimes. Alternatively, an existing customary norm of 
international law may create an obligation to prosecute certain crimes, even where a 
state has never explicitly agreed to such an obligation. Customary international law 
results from a general and consistent practice of states acting under a sense of legal 
obligation, or opinion juris. A law of customary international law may arise within a 
short period of time, but the state practice must be widespread and consistent. 
Specifically, any customary international law should reflect the practice of those 
states that are involved in the particular activity.148
147 A.U. Munoz, ‘An ICC investigation is the only hope that there will be justice against those who 
commit crimes against humanity,’ Columbia War Crimes Probe Urged, BBC News 29th June 2005. 
Available at: http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/americas/4633955.stm
148 A. Cassese, International Criminal Law (2008) Oxford University Press at 17-20.
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The Rome Statute also evidences a lack of consensus regarding the legality of 
amnesties, as the Statute is vague as to whether the ICC has jurisdiction over 
persons granted amnesties under domestic law. Domestic amnesties may prevent 
ICC prosecution in two ways. First, the Security Council may defer the prosecution 
for twelve months if it determines, pursuant to its Chapter VII powers, that an 
amnesty (or temporary amnesty) is necessary to maintain and restore international 
peace and security.149 After twelve months, the Security Council may renew its 
deferral if it continues to be in the best interest of international peace and security.150 
Second, the ICC prosecutor may decide not to prosecute a certain crime if the 
prosecution is:
'not in the interests of justice, taking into account all the circumstances, 
including the gravity of the crime, the interests of victims and the age or 
infirmity of the alleged perpetrator, and his or her role in the alleged 
crime’.151
These two provisions reflect a compromise between those parties who urged 
complete accountability, and those who desired a more flexible approach to promote 
stability, peace and reconciliation after periods of internal conflict. Recognising the 
widespread disagreement as to the validity of domestic amnesties under
149 Rome Statute 1998, Art. 16 (stating that the Security Council can request the ICC not to prosecute
adopting a resolution).
151 Ibid at Article 53.
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international law, Philippe Kirsch, the Chairman of the drafting committee, stated that 
the final version of the Rome Statute was ‘creatively ambiguous’.152
The UN has often taken the view that domestic amnesties for perpetrators of serious 
crimes under international law are not legitimate. Specifically, during the 
establishment of the Special Court of Sierra Leone (SCSL), the then UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan reported:
‘While recognizing that amnesty is an accepted legal concept and a gesture of 
peace and reconciliation at the end of civil war or an internal armed conflict, 
the United Nations has consistently maintained the position that amnesty 
cannot be granted in respect of international crimes, such as genocide, crimes 
against humanity or other serious violations of international humanitarian 
law’.153
However, the term consistently is somewhat misleading in that the UN has openly 
encouraged countries to grant amnesties on several occasions. The UN in 1994 
supported the South African amnesty as it viewed an amnesty as a way to aid 
transition and provide stabilisation.154 The amnesty in South Africa required 
perpetrators to engage in truth-telling and lustration as part of the deal.155 Moreover, 
in 1993 the UN in conjunction with the United States (US), helped negotiate a 
blanket amnesty agreement in order to resolve the internal conflict in Haiti. The UN
152 M. Scharf, ‘From the eXile Files: An Essay on Trading Justice for Peace,’ (2006) 63 Wash & Lee 
Law Review at 367
153 Report of the Secretary General on the establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
S/2000/915 4th October 2000.
154 L. Mallinder and K. McEvoy, ‘Rethinking amnesties: atrocity, accountability and impunity in post­
conflict societies’ (2012) 6(1) Contemporary Social Science at 113.
155 Ibid
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and US saw an amnesty as the best and least costly way to persuade the military to 
relinquish power, and therefore end the human rights abuses that threatened to send 
thousands of Haitians fleeing to the shores of the US.
There are also numerous instances in which the UN did not help negotiate the terms 
of the amnesty or indeed, encourage the parties to agree to the deal, but did take 
action to de facto legitimise the amnesty. For example, in 1996 at the conclusion of 
the amnesty deal in Guatemala, the UN Mission to Guatemala issued a public 
statement concluding that the proper scope of an amnesty deal lay ‘exclusively with 
the Guatemalan people’.156
Although the amnesty agreement did not have its desired effect and the fighting 
resumed, the UN in 1996 did not object to an amnesty clause in Sierra Leone for the 
rebels involved in the insurgency against the government.157 In addition, the Sierra 
Leone Truth Commission pointed out the UN’s inconsistent stance towards the 
amnesty laws in Sierra Leone. ‘It is not clear why unconditional amnesty was 
accepted by the United Nations in November 1996, only to be condemned as 
unacceptable in July 1999. This inconsistency in United Nations practice seems to 
underscore the complexity of the problem’.158 More recently, in 2003, a UN envoy 
helped negotiate the exile arrangement for Charles Taylor in Nigeria.159
157 S.C. Res. 1260, UN SCOR 53rd Sess., 4035th mtg., UN Doc. S/Res/1260 (1999)
158 Ibid at 164.
159 M. Scharf, ‘From the eXile Files: An Essay on Trading Justice for Peace,’ (2006) 63 Wash & Lee 
Law Review at 341.
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The UN does not consistently disapprove of amnesties. Instead, it appears to favour 
accountability over peace only when political costs are low. The UN’s inconsistent 
positions in Haiti and Sierra Leone illustrate this point.
In the Secretary General’s 2004 Report to the Security Council on the Rule of Law 
and Transitional Justice, Kofi Annan urged that the Security Council resolutions and 
mandates should:
‘reject any endorsement of amnesty for genocide, war crimes, or crimes 
against humanity, including those related to ethnic, gender and sexually 
based international crimes, [and] ensure that no such amnesty previously 
granted is a bar to prosecution before any United Nations created or assisted 
court’.160
State practice, especially the practice of states most affected by serious crimes 
under international law, is the strongest indication that there is no customary 
international law imposing a duty to prosecute perpetrators of such crimes. States 
have repeatedly granted amnesty from domestic prosecution to perpetrators of 
serious crimes under international law. Moreover, a number of states have 
participated in negotiating amnesties, suggesting that even states that are not 
affected by the crimes do not recognise any law that prohibits affected states from 
granting amnesty.
160 The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, Report of the 
Secretary-General, S.C. Res. 616, UN SCOR, 59th Session., at 21, UN Doc. S/2004/616 (2004).
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To illustrate, governments from every region of the world have decided to grant 
amnesties to individual perpetrators of international crimes. There is a long history 
of using amnesties in countries including; Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Sierra Leone, Haiti, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Afghanistan and Algeria.161 
In these instances, amnesties were granted to persons who had committed serious 
crimes under international law.
The fact that states grant amnesties to perpetrators of serious crimes under 
international law, and other states participate in these peace negotiations, suggests 
that many states believe that peace should perhaps be preferable to other 
objectives. Such state practice remains the strongest indication that there is no 
customary international law prohibiting amnesties for perpetrators of all serious 
crimes under international law. It is possible for amnesties, coupled with conditions 
can be a useful tool for post-conflict societies as well as provide a certain amount of 
accountability.
In contrast, international courts and tribunals generally disfavour amnesties, stating 
that states who grant amnesties have violated their international legal obligations. 
Nevertheless, even international courts have not been able to identify any customary 
international law with respect to amnesties. In Prosecutor v Furundzija, the ICTY 
had the opportunity to comment on the legality of amnesties, but decided not to 
stipulate the existence of a rule against amnesties for serious crimes under 
international law per se. Instead the ICTY stated that ‘amnesties are generally
161 The Proposed Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, August 2005.#Human Rights Watch, 
available at http://hrw.orq/backqround/mena/alaeria0905/3.htm
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incompatible with the duty of states to investigate [torture]’.162 This statement implies 
that some amnesties may be permissible. Furthermore, the use of the word 
'investigate' rather than 'prosecute' may suggest that only amnesties that seek to 
suppress the truth are incompatible with international law.
The Special Court of Sierra Leone (SCSL) also had to face the issue of amnesties. 
Specifically, whether the amnesty granted to the Sierra Leone rebels under the Lome 
Accords prevented the SCSL from prosecuting them under international law. The 
court first noted that there is ‘no general obligation for States to refrain from amnesty 
laws on these [Jus cogens] crimes’.163 States therefore do not “breach a customary 
international rule” in granting such amnesties.164 Even though the court concluded 
that Sierra Leone did not violate international law by granting the amnesty, it decided 
that the Lome Accords did not prevent SCSL from exercising jurisdiction over the 
criminals.
These international court decisions do not, however, establish that all amnesties for 
serious human rights abuses are illegal under international law, or that states have 
an international obligation to prosecute violations of international law.165 Indeed, 
international courts have shown a willingness to allow states to decide how to hold 
perpetrators accountable, and how to provide appropriate redress for victims.
162 Prosecutor v Anto Furundzija, Judgment Case No., IT-95-17/1-T, para. 155.
163 Prosecutor v Kallon & Kambara, Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lome Accord Amnesty,
Case Nos. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), SCSL-2004-16-AR72 para. 7 in L. Sadat, ‘Exile, Amnesty and
International Law1 (2006) 81 Notre Dame Law Review at 1018.
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Whilst state practice disproves the argument made by some activists and legal 
scholars that amnesties for serious violations of international law are illegal per se, 
this is not to say that all types of amnesties are considered legal. This can be 
illustrated by recent state practice which indicates that blanket amnesties may be 
illegal. States must provide some form of accountability, even if such accountability 
does not involve state prosecution, punishment, and incarceration.166 However, the 
precise demands of this obligation remain unclear. As illustrated, state practice is 
too inconsistent to identify the exact obligation. Professor Ronald Slye sums up the 
current requirements of international law, stating that it ‘requires some response to 
such atrocities’.167 This response may include creating truth commissions that 
expose wrongdoing, requiring the criminals to compensate the victims for their 
injuries, or imposing non-criminal penalties on the persons covered by the 
amnesty.168
Recent state practice supports the claim that international law requires some form of 
accountability. With the exceptions of the blanket amnesties enacted by Chile and 
Peru, both of which have subsequently been declared illegal, states have combined 
some mix of justice, truth, reparations in their amnesty laws. In fact, the amnesty in 
Uruguay, for example, allowed perpetrators of crimes to be held liable in civil 
courts.169 The South Africa amnesty legislation required perpetrators seeking 
amnesty to disclose their crimes and petition the courts for amnesty.170 Moreover,
166 R.C. Slye 'The Legitimacy of Amnesties Under International Law and General Principles of Anglo- 
American Law: Is a Legitimate Amnesty Possible? (2002) 43 Virginia Journal of International Law at 
201.
167 Ibid at 191
168 M.P. Scharf, 'From the eXile files: An essay on trading justice for peace,’ (2006) 63 Washington 
and Lee Law Review at 346.
169 Ibid
170 L. Mallinder, 'Indemnity, Amnesty, Pardon and Prosecution Guidelines in South Africa’ (2009) 
Working Paper No.2 From Beyond Legalism: Amnesties, Transition and Conflict Transformation,
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the Colombian amnesty legislation required that all perpetrators seeking amnesty 
disclose their crimes, turn over illegally acquired assets, and lay down their 
weapons.171
There is also evidence that state officials believe that they are under a legal 
obligation to hold criminals accountable, in some way, for their actions. The South 
African government, for example, rejected the National Party’s proposal for a blanket 
amnesty. The government declared its intent to abide by international law in drafting 
the amnesty legislation, thus indicating that a blanket amnesty could violate its 
international obligations.172 In 1999, the Argentine government acknowledged that 
all individuals have a right to truth, and declared that the government ‘accepts and 
guarantees the right to the truth, which involves the exhaustion of all means to obtain 
information on the whereabouts of disappeared persons’.173 Several Argentine courts 
have also declared the blanket amnesty laws to be inconsistent with international law 
and in 2003, repealed the Due Obedience and Full Stop Laws.174
This emerging custom of permitting amnesties while demanding some degree of 
accountability may strike the optimal balance between the competing interests of 
justice and peace. Requiring some degree of accountability will help prevent the 
notion of impunity from developing, while at the same time provide states the 
flexibility to negotiate peace agreements.
Institute of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Queen’s University Belfast last accessed 24/11/12 
accessed via:
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Jurisdiction and admissibility
The theory of universal jurisdiction rests on the notion that certain crimes affect the 
fundamental interests of the international community as a whole.175 Crimes against 
humanity, for instance, as implied by the terminology, affect not only the victims who 
were tortured or killed, but all of us.176 Individuals throughout the world have the 
right to prevent such crimes and seek retribution against perpetrators. Therefore, 
when courts exercise universal jurisdiction they are acting in the interests of the 
wider international community.
Recent domestic and international court decisions have reaffirmed the primacy of 
international law over domestic, and have established that domestic amnesties do 
not prevent others from prosecuting violations of international law. The SCSL also 
said that amnesties have no trans-national effect. The Court stated that:
‘where jurisdiction is universal, a State cannot deprive another State of its 
jurisdiction to prosecute the offender by the grant of amnesty. It is for this 
reason unrealistic to regard as universally effective the grant of amnesty by a 
State in regard to grave international crimes in which there exists universal 
jurisdiction’.177
The Court found that the Sierra Leone amnesty law did not violate international law, 
but also that it did not deprive the international community of the right to prosecute 
those persons who had committed serious crimes under international law.
175 Ibid 368-372.
176 D. Luban, ‘A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity’, (2004) 29 Yale Journal of International Law at 
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177 Prosecutor v Kallon & Kamara, Decision on Challenge to Jurisdicition: Lome Accord Amnesty, 
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Therefore, in respect of jus cogens, an amnesty may not extinguish liability under 
international law, even if it may provide immunity under domestic law.178
Although scholars and courts that have confronted the question agree that domestic 
amnesties do not bar prosecution in other forums, in reality there have been few 
attempts to prosecute persons covered by domestic amnesties. This is largely due 
to pragmatic reasons. Prior to 1998, the ICC did not exist, and the cost of creating 
ad hoc tribunals was substantial. Efforts to prosecute individuals in third party 
countries were futile so long as the perpetrator covered by the amnesty remained in 
his home country. Moreover, national courts may have been reluctant to prosecute 
perpetrators covered by domestic amnesties for reasons of international comity.
With the establishment of the ICC and the recent push towards accountability there 
is greater pressure on states, the UN, and the ICC Prosecutor to bring perpetrators 
of serious crimes under international law to justice. While preventing human rights 
atrocities is an important goal, there may still be good reason to respect domestic 
amnesties and refrain from prosecuting those protected by the amnesty. The referral 
of the situation in Northern Uganda following the enactment of The Amnesty Act to 
the ICC creates confusion.
Uganda
As mentioned earlier, amnesties are inherently political. The experience of Uganda 
means amnesties are no longer the sole concern of individual governments.179 The
178 A. Marie-Slaughter, ‘Defining the Limits: Universal Jurisdiction and National Courts,’ (2004) 
Universal Jurisdiction 171 -73.
179 L. Mallinder, Working Paper No. 1 'Uganda at a Crossroads: Narrowing an amnesty' From Beyond 
Lealism: Amnesties, Transition and Conflict Transformation, March 2009, Insitute of Criminology and
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international community has become increasingly disapproving of circumstances 
where amnesties offer immunity for serious human rights violations and seems 
fixated with criminal trials as a response to atrocity and method of achieving 
accountability. This fixation is a result of a number or factors which started with the 
drive for humanitarian interventions in the 1990s, the establishment of the ICC, a 
need for regional stability as well the need for Uganda’s resources. Whilst 
amnesties are political tools they are not always opposed for purely non-political 
reasons; opposition to amnesties might also be partly political both domestically and 
internationally.
In Uganda, The Amnesty Act 2000 was introduced to end a period of sustained civil 
war and as a tool to aid a peaceful resolution to the conflict. This legislation received 
support through the provision of funds and knowledge from various international 
organisations and donor states. The amnesty in Uganda differs to that of South 
Africa, which will be discussed later, as it was introduced during on-going conflict 
and not to aid political transition.
The situation in Uganda became even more interesting in 2003 with the referral by 
Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni of northern Uganda to the International 
Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC, exercising its jurisdiction under the referral, issued 
arrest warrants for individuals which had previously been provided with immunity by 
The Amnesty Act 2000.
Criminal Justice, Queen’s University Belfast, accessed;
http://www.aub.ac.uk/schools/SchoolofLaw/Research/lnstituteofCriminoloavandCriminalJustice/Resea
rch/BevondLeaalism/filestore/Filetoupload.152141.en.pdf
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This move has made many commentators and scholars question whether amnesties 
can play a positive role in resolving on-going conflict situations. A strong opponent 
of amnesties and their utility is Ricoeur.180 Ricoeur's main criticism of amnesties is 
that they fail to provide justice. However, as discussed by Mallinder and McEvoy, 
amnesties which are implemented through an institution or mechanism have the 
potential to provide a narrative through the ascertainment of the truth.181 As well as 
providing institutional recognition and acknowledgement.
The sustained period of conflict in Uganda is a result of a long chequered past, 
which Mallinder traces back to colonial rule.182 During this period Uganda was split 
into North and South, with Northern Ugandan, predominantly home of the Acholi 
people, chosen to be a 'labour reserve'. Whilst the south, home of the Baganda 
people, was chosen 'as cash crop and industrial zones'. Under British colonial rule 
this division was further apparent through the policy to recruit civil servants from the 
south and soldiers from the north. Over a period of time an underlying tension 
existed with those situated in the north being seen as the work horses of the country 
whilst those living in the south benefitted from better education and lived in relative 
prosperity.
Britain granted Uganda independence in 1962 leaving behind notable tension 
between the North and South. Indeed, Chatlani argues '[tjhis "divide and rule" policy 
stirred resentment and animosity between the two regions, resulting in a polarized
180 P. Ricoeur, Memory, history, forgetting, (2004) University of Chicago Press, Chicago, in L.
Mallinder and K. McEvoy, ‘Rethinking amnesties: atrocity, accountability and impunity in post-conflict 
societies’, (2012) 6(1) Contemporary Social Science at 122.
181 L. Mallinder, and K. McEvoy, K. ‘Rethinking amnesties: atrocity, accountability and impunity in 
post-conflict societies’, (2012) 6(1) Contemporary Social Science at 122.
182 Ibid at 122
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nation ripe for conflict.'183 Essentially this left Uganda vulnerable to opportunists who 
would use the tension and increasing animosity for their own political and economic 
gain. This led to the dictatorial regimes of Milton Obote and Idi Amin under which 
violence ensued. With the eventual removal from power by rebel groups in 1978, 
Uganda suffered a period of unstable governments all exploiting the division in the 
country for their own benefit.
This period of instability within Uganda provided opportunities for numerous guerrilla 
groups to operate within Uganda. Most notably the National Resistance Army (NRA) 
led by the current President, Yoweri Museveni, who came to power in 1986 and 
began a period of 'intensive anti-northern propaganda.'184 This period of violence, 
propaganda and heightened hostility culminated in what Mallinder explains as being 
'two competing narratives for the origins of the conflict.'185
Essentially these narratives pertain to those living in northern Uganda being to blame 
for starting the violence through jealousy. The Acholi could not accept that both 
political influence and economic might rested in the south. The other narrative tells 
the story of how the northern Ugandans had eventually comes to terms with
183 H. Chatlani, 'Uganda: A Nation in Crisis' (2007) 37 California Western International Law Journal at 
280-1.
184 O. Otunnu. 'Causes and Consequences of the War in Acholiland' in Okello Lucima (ed), Accord: 
Protracted Conflict, Elusive Peace: Initiatives to end the violence in northern Uganda, (2002) 
Conciliation Resources, London, in L. Mallinder, 'Uganda at a Crossroads: Narrowing the Amnesty?’ 
(2009) Working Paper No.1 From Beyond Legalism: Amnesties, Transition and Conflict 
Transformation, Institute of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Queen’s University Belfast accessed 
via:
http://www.aub.ac.uk/schools/SchoolofLaw/Research/lnstituteofCriminoloavandCriminalJustice/Resea 
rch/BevondLeaalism/filestore/Filetoupload. 152141 ,en. pdf
185 L. Mallinder, 'Uganda at a Crossroads: Narrowing the Amnesty?’ (2009) Working Paper No.1 From 
Beyond Legalism: Amnesties, Transition and Conflict Transformation, Institute of Criminology and 
Criminal Justice, Queen’s University Belfast accessed via:
http://www.aub.ac.uk/schools/SchoolofLaw/Research/lnstituteofCriminoloavandCriminalJustice/Resea 
rch/BevondLeaalism/filestore/Filetoupload.152141.en.pdf
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Museveni's victory, but in fact further human rights abuses carried out by Museveni's 
NRA was the starting point.
During the conflict various crimes were committed including 'rape, abductions, 
confiscation of livestock, killing of unarmed civilians, and the destruction of granaries, 
schools, hospitals and bore holes'.186 Furthermore, government soldiers engaged in 
mass looting of cattle, which 'was especially painful in the eyes of middle-aged and 
elderly Acholi'.187 Crimes committed during a period of conflict are not exclusively 
limited to the core international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes and crimes of aggression, but also include other, perhaps less serious crimes 
such as looting of cattle. Such lower level crimes can have a significant impact on 
the daily lives of members of society.
The on-going conflict within northern Uganda led to the formation of the Lord's 
Resistance Army (LRA), led by Joseph Kony. The LRA pursued a campaign against 
the very people they were created to fight on behalf of, which led to smaller militias 
being formed to combat the on-going violence being committed by the LRA. The 
conflict breached the borders of some neighbouring countries, in particular, Sudan.
186 O. Otunnu. 'Causes and Consequences of the War in Acholiland' in Okello Lucima (ed), Accord: 
Protracted Conflict, Elusive Peace: Initiatives to end the violence in northern Uganda, (2002) 
Conciliation Resources, London, in L. Mallinder, 'Uganda at a Crossroads: Narrowing the Amnesty?’ 
(2009) Working Paper No.1 From Beyond Legalism: Amnesties, Transition and Conflict 
Transformation, Institute of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Queen’s University Belfast accessed 
via:
http://www.aub.ac.uk/schools/SchoolofLaw/Research/lnstituteofCriminoloavandCriminalJustice/Resea
rch/BevondLeaalism/filestore/Filetoupload.152141.en.pdf
187 S. Finnstrom, Wars of the Past and War in the Present: The Lord’s Resistance Movement/Army in 
Uganda1, (2006) 76 Africa at 202-3. in L. Mallinder, 'Uganda at a Crossroads: Narrowing the 
Amnesty?’ (2009) Working Paper No.1 From Beyond Legalism: Amnesties, Transition and Conflict 
Transformation, Institute of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Queen’s University Belfast accessed 
via:
http://www.aub.ac.uk/schools/SchoolofLaw/Research/lnstituteofCriminoloavandCriminalJustice/Resea
rch/BevondLeaalism/filestore/Filetoupload.152141.en.pdf
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Uganda has a history of using amnesties to respond to political crises. In more 
recent times the Amnesty Act 2000 came into force in January 2000 grants amnesty, 
which is understood broadly as ‘pardon, forgiveness, exemption or discharge from 
criminal prosecution or any other punishment by the State’, to:
‘...any Ugandan who has at any time since the 26th day of January, 1986 
engaged in or is engaging in war or armed rebellion against the 
government of the Republic of Uganda by
(a) Actual participation in combat;
(b) Collaborating with the perpetrators of the war or armed rebellion;
(c) Committing any other crime in the furtherance of the war or armed 
rebellion; or
(d) Assisting or aiding the conduct or prosecution of the war or armed 
rebellion.188
It further states that individuals who fall within the scope of the amnesty ‘shall not be 
prosecuted or subjected to any form of punishment for the participation in the war or 
rebellion for any crime committed in the cause of war or armed rebellion’.189 The 
amnesty only applied to Ugandan nationals. The conflict was widespread, but 
excluded Sudanese nationals and other foreign nationals involved in the conflict with 
a start date is the time of President Museveni coming to power.
1Ha Amnesty Act 2000, s3(1)
189 Amnesty Act 2000, s3(2)
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The Ugandan amnesty offered blanket amnesty for all crimes committed during the 
conflict by non-state actors.190 Some amnesty laws are enacted as part of a wider 
transitional process, but the Ugandan amnesty was introduced in isolation of any 
other process. The beneficiaries of the amnesty were the Government’s opposition 
which meant there were no repercussions for Government forces, as they were seen 
as simply doing their duty. So maybe amnesties make sense of ‘superior orders’ 
which are not a defence in international law, but are surely intelligible. Whilst the 
Government’s opposition were recognised through an acknowledgment in the 
amnesty, no recognition was provided for Government forces.
Another interesting aspect of the Ugandan amnesty process is the establishment of 
an Amnesty Commission. The role of the Amnesty Commission is to implement 
amnesty which provides the opportunity to scrutinise decision making as to whether 
or not an amnesty should be provided, policed and managed. The monitoring not 
only means individual perpetrators are being held to account for their actions, but the 
mechanism itself is being held to account for their decision-making to the state, to 
victims and the wider community. It is also possible for victims to challenge the 
decision to grant amnesty to a perpetrator. This process provides legitimacy to 
amnesties and, whilst not prosecutions, have a real impact on criminal justice.
South Africa
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (SATRC) required 
perpetrators to disclose information relating to their conduct in order to be granted
190 L. Mallinder, 'Uganda at a Crossroads: Narrowing the Amnesty?’ (2009) Working Paper No.1 From 
Beyond Legalism: Amnesties, Transition and Conflict Transformation, Institute of Criminology and 
Criminal Justice, Queen’s University Belfast at 3 accessed via:
http://www.aub.ac.uk/schools/SchoolofLaw/Research/lnstituteofCriminoloavandCriminalJustice/Resea
rch/BevondLeaalism/filestore/Filetoupload.152141.en.pdf
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amnesty. South Africa is a prime example on the effectiveness of amnesties which 
are implemented through a formal mechanism. A truth-recovery facility was attached 
to the amnesty as well as 'measures to acknowledge victims' suffering and to provide 
reparations.'191
That truth, which the victims of repression seek desperately to know is, in the 
circumstances, much more likely to be forthcoming if those responsible for 
such monstrous misdeeds are encouraged to disclose the whole truth with the 
incentive that they will not receive the punishment which they undoubtedly 
deserve if they do. Without that incentive there is nothing to encourage such 
persons to make the disclosures and to reveal the truth which persons in the 
positions of the applicants so desperately desire'.192
To clarify the discussion so far, where there are amnesties that include some form of 
accountability, these do not violate international law. In addition, domestic 
amnesties do not prevent other countries or international tribunals from exercising 
universal jurisdiction over the persons covered by the amnesty.
191 Ibid
192 Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) and others v the President of the Republic of South Africa 
and others 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC), para 17. in. L. Mallinder, 'Uganda at a Crossroads: Narrowing the 
Amnesty?’ (2009) Working Paper No.1 From Beyond Legalism: Amnesties, Transition and Conflict 
Transformation, Institute of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Queen’s University Belfast at 89-90 
accessed via:
http://www.aub.ac.uk/schools/SchoolofLaw/Research/lnstituteofCriminoloavandCriminalJustice/Resea
rch/BevondLeqalism/filestore/Filetoupload.152141.en.pdf
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Expression of sovereignty
McEvoy and Mallinder have spent a considerable amount of time researching the 
role of amnesties in international law.193 The focus is on national amnesties and 
addresses the main criticisms surrounding the use of amnesties. Interestingly, they 
make the assertion that amnesties, and the granting of amnesties, are a sovereign 
right of a state.
On one level an amnesty maybe seen as a compromise between those involved in a 
conflict. Another view point raised by McEvoy and Mallinder is '...the granting of 
amnesties also represents an important expression of state power and 
sovereignty'.194 This links back with the idea of control as discussed by Mulgan and 
discussed in a previous chapter.
Whilst much of the literature concerning amnesties seems to suggest that amnesties 
for the most serious crimes are illegal and that states should seek to prosecute and 
punish perpetrators. McAvoy and Mallinder observe that 'no international convention 
has explicitly prohibited amnesty laws'.195
Truth
Mulgan’s final extension of accountability in providing a dialogue can be present in 
amnesty arrangements (see Chapter 1). As previously discussed, amnesties have 
been, and continue to be linked with, a truth recovery process which provides an
193 K. McEvoy and L. Mallinder, ‘Amnesties in Transition: Punishment, Restoration, and the 
Governance of Mercy,’ (2012) 39(3) Journal of Law and Society 410-40.
194 Ibid at 414
195 Ibid at 417
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opportunity for a narrative of events. However, questions have arisen with regard to 
the quality and accuracy of truth through such processes.
Rather poignantly the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission's
(SATRC) report stated '[t]he amnesty process was a key to eliciting as much
truth as possible about past atrocities'.196 The report goes on to discuss how the 
truth-ascertainment process worked as a result of engagement with the process and 
this was only facilitated through the removal of the possibility of punishment.
Justice
Many commentators observe that amnesties are the antithesis of justice, amongst 
other things. However, McEvoy and Mallinder address this issue and argue that 
amnesties can actually help achieve justice as well as provide an opportunity for the 
cessation of hostility. If an amnesty is part of a wider process with certain conditions 
attached an amnesty can help provide a record of events through the use of 
testimony from participants to the conflict. A conditional amnesty can also provide 
stabilisation within a state and facilitate a process of lustration, which provides justice 
for the wider community.
Scharf argues that under Article 16 of the Rome Statute the International Criminal 
Court may have to defer to a national amnesty if a United Nations Security Council
196 South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report, vol.6, ch 1, para 25. in L. Mallinder, 
'Uganda at a Crossroads: Narrowing the Amnesty?’ (2009) Working Paper No.1 From Beyond 
Legalism: Amnesties, Transition and Conflict Transformation, Institute of Criminology and Criminal 
Justice, Queen’s University Belfast accessed via:
http://www.aub.ac.uk/schools/SchoolofLaw/Research/lnstituteofCriminoloavandCriminalJustice/Resea 
rch/BevondLeaalism/filestore/Filetoupload.152141 .en.pdf
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Resolution is adopted under their Chapter VII powers.197 Such a resolution could 
either request that any investigations and/or prosecutions are stopped, or call for the 
deferral of any prosecution in progress.198 An example of this is the adoption of 
Resolution 1593 in Darfur which referred the situation to the ICC, however, Scharf 
notes that at the same time it prevented the ICC from exercising jurisdiction over 
foreign military personnel.199
It has been argued that ‘emerging democratic practice has more to lose in a situation 
where the community is divided than where it is united under the banner of 
reconciliation and amnesty’.200 This links to the notion that such wrong-doing affects 
‘the collective’, the wider community and only if the community comes back together 
can there be long-lasting peace and stability.
In light of Article 16 of the ICC Statute, The Security Council has the legal authority 
to require the court to respect an amnesty...if two requirements are met...'201 These 
include where there is a threat to peace and where a resolution is granted to 
maintaining peace or resolving threatening situations.202
197 M.P. Scharf, 'From the eXile files: An essay on trading justice for peace,’ (2006) 63 Washington 
and Lee Law Review at 368.
198 Ibid
199 Ibid at 369
200 B. Chigara, Amnesty in International Law: The Legality under International Law of National 
Amnesty Laws. (2002) Longman, Pearson Education at at 19.
201M.P. Scharf, 'From the eXile files: An essay on trading justice for peace,’ (2006) 63 Washington
and Lee Law Review at 369.
202 .Ibid
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Recognition
Chapter 2 discussed recognition in a broader sense and asserted that as part of this 
area falls reparation. Reparation goes beyond the need for a legal sanction or 
monetary awards and includes acknowledgements and apologies. A conditional 
amnesty provides victims and affected communities with a narrative of events and 
acknowledgment of the atrocity.
In his text, Chigara makes reference to Hayner who questioned ‘[c]an a society, 
writes Hayner, build a democratic future on a foundation of blind, denied, or forgotten 
history?’203 As Mallinder and McEvoy highlight in their article, conditional amnesties 
do not deny past wrong-doing and are part of a wider transitional process.204 
Recognition is about re-establishing people as citizens.
Chigara enters into the discourse surrounding the key arguments concerning 
amnesty.205 One of the concerns Chigara refers to, which is raised when discussing 
the legitimacy of amnesty is where the prospect of the desired peace and 
democracy, sought through the implementation of an amnesty, is short lived or fails 
to occur?206 However, no mechanism provides an ideal outcome, and as will be 
discussed in later chapters, each mechanism has its' own strengths and weaknesses 
dependent on the context in which it is being used.
203P.B. Hayner, ‘Fifteen Truth Commissions -  1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study’, (1994) 16(4) 
Human Rights Quarterly at 597, in B. Chigara, Amnesty in International Law: The Legality under 
International Law of National Amnesty Laws. (2002) Longman, Pearson Education at 19.
204 Mallinder, L. and McEvoy, K. ‘Rethinking amnesties: atrocity, accountability and impunity in post­
conflict societies’, (2011) 6(1) Contemporary Social Science 107-128.
205 Chigara, B. Amnesty in International Law: The Legality under International Law of National 
Amnesty Laws. (2002) Longman, Pearson Education..
206 Ibid.
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Interestingly, in her Working Paper, Mallinder points out that amongst the objectives 
of the amnesty process in South Africa was the desire to ‘advance...reconciliation 
and reconstruction...’207 On the whole many commentators agree with Mallinder that 
South Africa provides an example of the usefulness of amnesties with state transition 
without the need to disregard all facets of accountability. Indeed, a carefully 
designed amnesty process coupled with complementary mechanisms can provide 
accountability. An amnesty can provide recognition through political participation 
and have proven to be a useful tool when part of a wider restorative process. It is 
also possible to achieve stabilisation with a state where a conditional amnesty has 
been implemented, as seen in South Africa.
Amnesty as an alternative to prosecution: a means to an end?
On the one hand, amnesties may seem to be nothing more than a symbolic 
response to accountability. However, on the other hand, if an amnesty provides for 
the cessation of conflict then it would be prudent to allow amnesty to remain in the 
repertoire of mechanisms designed to address past wrong-doing in a post-conflict 
setting. A broad and general amnesty alone cannot provide the required level of 
accountability sought by the international community, but a conditional amnesty can 
provide accountability.
The South African amnesty process has also been credited as offering an 
alternative, more restorative form of justice, in which offenders can be held
207 Interim Constitution 1993, Postamble, in L. Mallinder, 'Indemnity, Amnesty, Pardon and 
Prosecution Guidelines in South Africa’ (2009) Working Paper No.2 From Beyond Legalism: 
Amnesties, Transition and Conflict Transformation, Institute of Criminology and Criminal Justice, 
Queen’s University Belfast last accessed 24/11/12 accessed via:
http://www.aub.ac.uk/schools/SchoolofLaw/Research/lnstituteofCriminoloavandCriminalJustice/Resea
rch/BevondLeaalism/filestore/Filetoupload.152146.en.pdf
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accountable and victims can be acknowledged.’208 South Africa is certainly a lesson 
on how effective conditional amnesties can be after a period of conflict.
Summary
The international community is at a crossroads. While states have continued to pass 
amnesties and negotiate peace deals, many UN officials and international legal 
scholars have argued that granting amnesties to perpetrators of serious crimes 
under international law violates international legal norms. These demands for 
greater accountability have had some effect and states have increasingly 
incorporated mechanisms into amnesty deals for holding perpetrators of crimes 
accountable for their actions. An amnesty carefully constructed in a way which 
obliges perpetrators to participate in an accountability process is a useful and 
legitimate mechanism.
Conditional amnesties are inherently political tools, which can provide opportunities 
to provide an account of a conflict, facilitate the process of lustration and 
acknowledge wrong-doing. It is also commonplace for amnesties to be coupled with 
a truth commission to facilitate truth-telling and encourage participation. The next 
chapter will focus on truth commissions in the context of accountability and whether 
such a mechanism can provide the required level of truth, justice and recognition.
208 L. Mallinder, 'Indemnity, Amnesty, Pardon and Prosecution Guidelines in South Africa’ (2009) 
Working Paper No.2 From Beyond Legalism: Amnesties, Transition and Conflict Transformation, 
Institute of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Queen’s University Belfast last accessed 24/11/12 
accessed via:
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Chapter Four: Truth Commissions
‘...countries recover from the trauma and wounds of the past, they have had 
to devise mechanisms not only for handling past human rights violations, but 
also to ensure that the dignity of victims, survivors and relatives is restored’.209
Following a period of conflict a state is faced with a period of transition. During this 
period of transition a state is tasked with addressing injustices and creating rule of 
law and peace and restorative justice is said to provide a mechanism through which 
this can be achieved. One alternative mechanism to prosecution that sits within 
restorative justice is a truth commission. Truth commissions are justified on the 
basis that they not only elicit honesty and openness but 'hold offenders to account' 
when prosecutions are not a viable option.
Previous chapters have highlighted the importance of accountability and proponents 
of truth commissions in particular stress the importance of addressing past 
wrongdoing.210 The emphasis in truth commissions is placed on victims and the role 
they must play in reconciling a state.
Supporters of truth commissions argue that truth-telling, fact finding and providing a 
narrative of the conflict are enough to satisfy the accountability needs of victims, their 
families and the wider society. However, as previously mentioned in Chapter 2,
209 N. Kritz, ed., N. Mandela, Foreward: Transitional Justice-How Emerging Democracies Reckon with 
Former Regimes, vol.1 (Washington DC., United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995.1995) in 
Review Conference of the Rome Statute, Kampala -  Confronting Impunity: The role of Truth 
commissions in Building Reconciliation and National Unity, (2010) ICC RC/ST/PJ/INF.5.
210N.J. Kritz, ‘Coming to Terms with Atrocities: A Review of Accountability Mechanisms for Mass 
Violations of Human Rights,’ (1996) 59(4) Law and Contemporary Problems 127-152.
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there is increasing recognition around the call for the prosecution of perpetrators 
both by those most directly affected, but also the international community. On this 
basis, a state is in a particularly difficult position, particularly following the possible 
effects of lustration, which is the ‘purging of public servants who are thought to be 
responsible for international crimes,211 when a newly formed government is deciding 
how to address past wrongdoing and reconcile a potentially divided society. The 
political nature of a period of transition should not be underestimated.
A government may find a number of constraints which would deter it from large scale 
prosecutions. In particular, Kerner states, prosecutions would exceed any 
‘conceivable amount of resources in terms of money, personnel, and above all the 
amount of time needed to deal with each case, not to speak of the quality of handling 
the matter, and a possible solution or final decision that would meet the needs of all 
participants, and above all the victims’.212
Truth commissions are commonly used in transitional justice settings and often try to 
balance the needs of both the victims, offenders and wider community. The 
objective is to address both the past by holding perpetrators to account and provide 
a forum for the presentation of testimony that is not subject to judicial scrutiny or 
procedural constraints while creating the conditions for a peaceful future by
211 R. Cryer, H. Friman, D. Robinson and E. Wilmshurst, An Introduction to International Criminal 
Law and Procedure, 2nd Edition (2010) Cambridge University Press at 575.
212 H. Kerner, Crime Control Developments in Post-Modern Societies and in Societies in Transition: 
Looking for Possible Common Features between Seemingly Unrelated Discourses and Practices, 
also with Regard to the Implementation of Restorative Justice, in E. Van der Spuy, S. Parmentier and 
A. Dissel, Restorative Justice -  Politics and Prospects (2007) Juta Publishing at 52.
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reconciling all groups in society and to do so in such a way that does not undermine 
the transition.213
A report given by the then Secretary-General to the Security Council, presented in 
August 2004, recognises the role of truth commissions in post-conflict justice:
‘Another important mechanism for addressing past human rights abuses is the 
truth commission. Truth commissions are official, temporary, non-judicial fact­
finding bodies that investigate a pattern of abuses of human rights or 
humanitarian law committed over a number of years. These bodies take a 
victim-centred approach and conclude their work with a final report of findings 
of fact and recommendations’.214
Truth commissions are bodies that ‘(1) investigate the past, (2)...investigate a 
pattern of abuses over a period of time, rather than a specific event, (3) ...[are] 
temporary...completing...[their]...work with the submission of a report, and (4)...are 
officially sanctioned, authorized or empowered by the State’.215 This is somewhat of 
a contrast to criminal trials which are concerned with individual wrong-doing and 
emphasise careful inclusion and exclusion of evidence, rather than open, 
untrammelled and frank narrative.
213R. Teitel, Transitional Justice, (2000) Oxford University Press.
214 The Rule of law and transitional justice in post-conflict societies’, UN Doc. S/2004/616, para. 50, in 
W.A. Schabas, ‘A Synergistic Relationship: The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
and the Special Court of Sierra Leone’, (2004) 15 Criminal Law Forum at 52.
215 P. Hayner, Unspeakable truths: Confronting state terror and atrocity (2001) New York: Routledge 
in N. Dimitrijevic, 'Justice Beyond Blame: Moral Justification of (The Idea of) A Truth Commission,' 
(2006), 50(3) The Journal of Conflict Resolution at 373.
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Many commentators question whether truth-telling serves as an effective mechanism 
in achieving justice and provides the necessary level of accountability required for 
the most heinous crimes. The rise of restorative justice, as a post-conflict 
mechanism to restore peace and civility cannot be denied.216 However, with 
particular focus on truth commissions, how realistic is it that a truth commission can 
reconcile a post-conflict state when sections of a society will only view formal 
prosecutions as a way of moving forward?
A truth commission has been defined by Teitel as ‘...an official body, often created 
by a national government, to investigate, document, and report upon human rights 
abuses within a country over a specific period of time’.217 Teitel’s description of a 
truth commission fits within the accountability model described in Chapter 2. The 
truth-ascertaining emerges from the investigations, which can also have an impact 
on justice, whilst recognition comes in the form of official reports and documentation.
Truth commissions are a common mechanism used in post-conflict situations218. In 
particular, Brahm states ‘..., the truth commission has become a staple of post­
conflict peace building efforts.’219 Further, he argues this is particularly true in 
instances involving political transitions rather than instances where one side has 
been victorious, thereby negating possible claims of victors’ justice.
216 Review Conference of the Rome Statute, ‘Confronting Impunity: The role of Truth Commissions in 
Building Reconciliation and National Unity, (2010) Para.25.
217 R. Teitel, R. 'Transitional Justice Genealogy', (2003b) 16 Harvard Human Rights Journal at 78.
218 E. Brahm, 'Uncovering the Truth: Examining Truth Commission Success and Impact,' (2007) 8 
International Studies Perspectives at 16.
219lbid
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The 1990s saw an increase in the number of truth commissions established. The 
purpose of a truth commission is ‘...to compile a truthful record of the abuses.’220 
Thereby creating a narrative of the conflict which may be cathartic for a post-conflict 
society.
Hayner states truth commissions acknowledge past wrong doing, respond to victims’ 
needs, further justice and accountability, investigate institutional responsibility and 
recommend reforms and aims to record the 'greatest possible' number of crimes, 
whilst seeking to promote peace and reconciliation.221 In addition, Hayner argues 
that truth commissions are superior to criminal trials. One of Hayner’s concerns of 
criminal trials is that they tend to individualise conflict which is inherent in the 
process due to the rise of individual accountability.222 This is also a concern for 
Drumbl in that the increasing demand for criminal trials focuses on a mechanism 
designed to address individual conduct in a context which is much broader and 
community wide.223 Truth commission have the capacity to not only focus on 
individual perpetrators and victims, but also provide institutional accountability 
through revealing ‘the institutional failings that allowed the crimes to occur’.224 Truth 
commissions provide an opportunity to address such failings, which provides broader 
accountability and a greater opportunity to address past crimes and provide an 
institutional framework to safeguard against future conflict, thereby helping to provide 
social stability.
220 D. Roche, Truth Commission Amnesties and the International Criminal Court,' (2005) 45 British 
Journal of Criminology at 565.
221 P. Hayner, Unspeakable truths: Confronting state terror and atrocity (2001) New York: Routledge 
in N. Dimitrijevic, 'Justice Beyond Blame: Moral Justification of (The Idea of) A Truth Commission,'
, 50(3) The Journal of Conflict Resolution at 373.
224E. Brahm, ‘Uncovering the Truth: Examining Truth Commission Success and Impact’, (2007) 8 
International Studies Perspectives at 21.
223 Ibid
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The absence of a criminal liability features heavily within a truth commission, 
However, there can be a disclosure relationship between international courts and 
truth commissions.225 Therefore, it is not impossible that evidence to truth 
commissions could become evidence in a prosecution. For example, the truth 
commission in Argentina in 1983 produced documentation which aided the 
prosecutions of the military.226 In fact, the threat of prosecutions can aid truth 
commissions in their success in obtaining testimony.227
Brahm acknowledges that truth commissions ‘represent some form of accountability 
for human rights abuses.’228 Indeed, in his article Brahm jostles with the pros and 
cons of truth commissions mentioning a body of emerging literature which question 
the role of amnesties. Again, such critiques come from those commentators which 
equate accountability with prosecution and punishment, but accountability in such 
extraordinary circumstances needs to be broader.
Mendeloff in his article229 discusses peace building initiatives and the increasing 
rhetoric around the need to hold individuals accountable and how ‘some kind of
formal accounting of the past is essential to achieve lasting peace in war-torn
states’. Mendeloff goes further and discusses how formal criminal prosecutions and 
alternative mechanisms such as truth commissions are amongst the ‘repertoire’ of
225 N.J. Kritz, ‘Coming to Terms with Atrocities: A Review of Accountability Mechanisms for Mass
Violations of Human Rights,’ (1996) 59(4) Law and Contemporary Problems at 143.
228E. Brahm, ‘Uncovering the Truth: Examining Truth Commission Success and Impact’, (2007) 8
International Studies Perspectives at 21.
229 D. Mendeloff, ‘Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling and Postconflict Peacebuilding:.Curb the Enthusiasm?’ 
(2004) 6(3) International Studies Review 355-380.
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activities used in the pursuit of peace. This adds further support for Drumbl’s 
argument that international criminal justice should be pluralised as to allow and 
acknowledge the benefits of alternative mechanisms.
The issue of plurality and a repertoire of mechanisms are important as the issues, 
needs and wants of a post-conflict society cannot be addressed solely through the 
utility of criminal trials. In fact, criminal trials can create further tensions, as with the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), and conflict, thereby impacting 
on reconciliation. Criminal trials also have a number of other deficiencies which will 
be discussed in Chapter 5. Assuming there is a one size fits all approach for how 
post-conflict societies address past wrong-doing ignores the complexity of the issues 
such a society faces.
Appropriateness of truth commissions
‘Any process must seek to restore civic trust by citizens in the institutions of 
government’.230 A further function of a truth commission is lustration. The ritual 
sacrifice of an individual, in which they are publically shamed and will no longer hold 
public office appeases victims and gets ex-oppressors out of positions of power. Is 
this a happy alternative to expensive prosecutions?
Recent reports discuss the intention to establish a truth commission to address 
human rights abuses in Brazil.231 Perhaps such moves to establish a truth
230 Review Conference of the Rome Statute, Kampala -  Confronting Impunity: The role of Truth 
commissions in Building Reconciliation and National Unity, (2010) ICC RC/ST/PJ/INF.5.
231 The Independent, Truth commission to tackle Brazil’s dark past’, 23rd September 2011 accessed 
via: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/truth-commission-to-tackle-brazils-dark-past- 
2359357.html
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commission is an indication of the appropriateness of such mechanisms and raises 
issues as to the extent to which truth commissions provide for accountability.
Much of the debate on the appropriateness and effectiveness of truth commissions is 
in relation to the role such truth commissions play in peace building and helping to 
reconcile and go through a period of transition from a point of conflict to one of 
peace: solely achieved by providing a forum for truth telling. However, is truth telling 
really important and is a truth commission more likely to reveal the truth than a 
formal trial?
Truth
Truth-telling, as discussed in Chapter 2, has become ever more prominent and is 
deemed an essential component of peace building.232 Thus, acknowledging that 
‘truth’ plays an important role. The claim is that the establishing the 'truth' about the
state's past wrongs can serve to lay the foundation of the new political order’.233
Truth in the context of truth commissions has two distinct facets, which are truths 
about individual wrong-doing as well as actions and events at an institutional and 
communal level.
Walker discusses the increasing presence of the ‘right to truth’ in international 
documents.234 This ‘right to truth’ is suggested to help with reparations to victims 
and their families and also acknowledges the need to address past abuses and 
move forward:
232 D. Mendeloff, 'Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling, and Postconflict Peacebuilding: Curb the 
Enthusiasm?,' (2004) 6(3) International Studies Review at 358.
233 R. Teitel, Transitional Justice, (2000) Oxford University Press, UK at 69.
234 M.U. Walker, 'Truth Telling As Reparations,' (2010) 41(4) Metaphilosophy 0026-1068.
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‘[t]he creation of a public record of a country’s wrongdoing can provide a 
valuable opportunity to reshape a country’s collective memory, by both 
encouraging private and public reflection on the past and by leaving a 
permanent record which can be relied upon by generations of future 
historians’.235
The creation of a narrative through the truth-ascertaining function of a truth 
commission can help alleviate suffering, as well as potentially acting as a deterrent. 
This process establishes a record, one which can subject perpetrators to 
embarrassment and humiliation which could help act as a deterrent, but also, the 
record does not shy away from institutional or government wrong-doing.236
Justice
The increasing popularity of truth commissions has resulted in many to criticise the 
mechanism, particularly in relation to achieving justice. Increasingly questioning the 
effectiveness of truth commissions and whether the aims are achievable in reality.
Can truth-telling serves as an effective mechanism in achieving ‘justice’ and for 
providing accountability for the most heinous crimes? Much of the discussion 
around truth commissions takes place in relation to transitional justice, more 
specifically, restorative justice. The rise of restorative justice as a post-conflict 
mechanism to restore peace and civility cannot be denied. Within restorative justice
235 M. Osiel, Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory, and the Law. (2000) New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers, in D. Roche, Truth Commission Amnesties and the International Criminal Court,1 (2005) 
45 British Journal of Criminology at 569.
236 D. Roche, Truth Commission Amnesties and the International Criminal Court,' (2005) 45 British 
Journal of Criminology at 569.
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lie truth commissions which provide for the assertion that ‘[jjustice should include 
truth recovery, recognition, reparations, as well as the restoration of civic trust and 
the building of social solidarity or cohesion’.237
As with accountability, the concept of ‘justice’ is surely dependent on the audience? 
There is a Western dominant view of how justice can be achieved, but empirical 
research on the ground suggests that justice may well mean the prosecution and 
punishment, but other societies view justice from differing perspectives. For 
example, Northern Uganda and Timor-Leste both have a history of traditional 
mechanisms with the sole aim to heal the local community after some form of wrong­
doing.238 Some societies such as Uganda have a history of using cleansing 
ceremonies to address wrong-doing and heal the community, known as nyono tong 
gweno. 239 Which involves an entire local community coming together to 
acknowledge wrong-doing and try to heal itself.
Recognition
According to Dzur, accountability is achieved through a truth commission by the 
recognition of past crimes, the taking of responsibility by those responsible and 
provides a forum for perpetrators to demonstrate regret and show remorse for their 
actions.240 This is also the view of Sooka who states that recognition is provided by
237Y. Sooka, ‘Dealing with the past and transitional justice: building peace through accountability’
(2006) 88(862) International Review of the Red Cross at 317.
K. McEvoy and L. Mallinder, ‘Amnesties in Transition: Punishment, Restoration, and the 
Governance of Mercy’ (2012) 39(3) Journal of Law and Society at 432.
239 L. Mallinder, 'Uganda at a Crossroads: Narrowing the Amnesty?’ (2009) Working Paper No.1 From 
Beyond Legalism: Amnesties, Transition and Conflict Transformation, Institute of Criminology and 
Criminal Justice, Queen’s University Belfast accessed via:
http://www.aub.ac.uk/schools/SchoolofLaw/Research/lnstituteofCriminoloqyandCriminalJustice/Resea 
rch/BevondLeaalism/filestore/Filetoupload.152141.en.pdf
240 A.W. Dzur, 'Restorative Justice and Civic Accountability for Punishment,' (2003) 36(1) 
Northeastern Political Science Association 3-22.
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a forum in which victims can also actively participate in the process and have their 
say whilst having the wrongdoing acknowledged by the rest of the community. 
According to Sooka, such a ‘public acknowledgement by an official body contributes 
to their affirmation and healing’.241
To provide recognition involves an acknowledgement of identity (that details 
who people are and what they have experienced) alongside simultaneous 
actions to enhance emancipation and respond to what subordinated parties 
need to gain parity with others.’242
In this context, a truth commission allows for the acknowledgement of the 
perpetrator, the victim(s) and any institutional involvement. So whilst helping to 
establish the involvement of perpetrators truth commissions are also concerned with 
providing recognition for victims.243
It has been asserted that ‘...the principal role of truth commissions is to prime 
transitional states for deeper, radical change.’244 Deeper in the sense that it allows 
for institutional accountability. Institutional accountability is provided by truth 
commissions as they seek to not only address wrong-doing by individuals, but to 
hold an institution or government accountable for their involvement in the conflict.
241 Y. Sooka, ‘Dealing with the past and transitional justice: building peace through accountability’ 
(2006) 88(862) International Review of the Red Cross at 318.
242 E. Stanley, Truth Commissions and the Recognition of State Crime,’ (2005) 45 British Journal of
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A part of recognition is concerned with reconciliation and in the context of a post­
conflict society, does not require the forgiveness by victims, or the wider society, to 
perpetrators, but it does require the peaceful existence within the same community. 
Not only does reconciliation require truth and some form of acknowledgement, it 
‘requires that offenders be treated fairly’.245
Issues with providing recognition through truth commissions
However,‘...despite such potential, the ability of truth commissions to provide full 
recognition is hindered by significant operational, social and political factors.’246 This 
is due to the somewhat labouring process in the truth-ascertaining aspect of a truth 
commission.
Stanley states ‘truth commissions actually tend to inhibit the recognition of state 
crime.’247 In addition truth commissions have been said to only provide ‘...partial 
recognition of crimes, victims and perpetrators; they tend to simplify identities and 
needs, to fit the political landscape; and they are operationalized in a way that 
disconnects identity from the remedies required to deal with injustice.’248 In practical 
terms it can be difficult to collate testimony from victims and the wider community. 
‘As such, certain victims, such as indigenous or poor populations, or women, can 
find they are less likely than others to be identified and provided with space for 
dialogue in the aftermath of state crime.’ 249 In Timor Leste the ‘reconciliation 
hearings tended to reflect the dominance of men in traditional dispute resolution
245 D. Roche, Truth Commission Amnesties and the International Criminal Court,' (2005) 45 British 
Journal of Criminology at 573.
246 E. Stanley, Truth Commissions and the Recognition of State Crime,’ (2005) 45 British Journal of
Criminology at 583.
processes’. In the case of Timor Leste the dominance of men hindered the extent to 
which women could participate in the process and to have their say, thereby limiting 
the extent to which women could have their suffering acknowledged.
Heralded as a particular success story, the South Africa Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (SATRC), is used as a good example of how a truth and reconciliation 
commission can help transition despite the fact that the South Africa TRC was 
deemed ‘costly in terms of both money and in the failure to produce retributive 
justice.’250 Other commentators challenge this success story, particularly with regard 
to the lack of recognition of victims and their needs.
The SATRC has been accused of making misleading claims about victims being 
amenable to forgiveness and that they were only interested in symbolic reparation.251 
In particular, ‘the Commission engaged in subtle suppression of victims’ feelings that 
falsely heralded notions of forgiveness and reconciliation over views of retribution or 
desires for financial reparation’.252
In which case, the SATRC failed to recognise the true extent of the needs and wants 
of victims. Victims are central to the functioning of a truth commission and therefore, 
failing to recognise and address their true needs results in the truth commission 
being nothing more than symbolic in nature. It also weakens the position of being
250 J.L. Gibson, The Contributions of Truth to Reconciliation: Lessons from South Africa,' (2006) 50(3) 
The Journal of Conflict Resolution at 411.
251 G. Simpson, Tell No Lies, Claim No Easy Victories: A Brief Evaluation of South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, in D. Posel and G. Simpson, Commissioning the Past: Understanding
South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, eds. Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University 
Press, in E. Stanley, Truth Commissions and the Recognition of State Crime,’ (2005) 45 British 
Journal of Criminology at 592.
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able ‘to push for radical change and to inform South African society about the 
complexity of victimization’.253
A crucial part of recognition, in this context, is for any recommendations made by a 
truth commission to be considered and acknowledged by the state. However, it is 
commonplace for such recommendations to be ignored.254 In such a scenario: 
where a truth commission fails to properly recognise victims and their needs, and the 
final recommendations are ignored, it proves to be nothing more than a symbolic 
exercise. However, truth commissions are an end in themselves and not just a 
means to an end.
Questions could also be raised over the quality and full extent of the truth than can 
be uncovered within a process which suppresses the role of the victims. In fact, it
has been stated that ‘...this inability to respond to what victims need ensures that
the injustices of the past remain open’.255 However, truth commissions have a 
greater capacity than say, trials, for including more victims in the process and can 
provide a narrative of events, acknowledgment of wrong-doing and victims, a forum 
for perpetrators to show remorse and recognition at both an individual and 
institutional level.
Truth commissions are uniquely placed to expose the complexity of state crime, to 
revalue the identities of victims and to promote suggestions on how justice can be
253 E. Stanley, Truth Commissions and the Recognition of State Crime,’ (2005) 45 British Journal of 
Criminology at 592.
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255 B. Hamber, D. Nageng and G. O’Malley,"Telling it Like it is Understanding the Truth and
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further attained through social, legal and political measures. However, truth 
commissions have to be approached with a certain degree of caution, as they do not 
tend to provide full recognition. Some commissions, like in South Africa, present a 
partial recognition of victims and perpetrators, and they simplify identities and needs 
to connect with dominant political agenda. This links back to Mulgan’s concerns 
about the power in-balances involved when trying to hold someone, or particularly an 
institution, accountable. One of the many issues with accountability is concerned 
with holding someone or an institution, with considerably more power and influence, 
to account for any part they have played in the conflict. Truth commissions broader 
focus, one which goes beyond individual wrong-doing helps to address this 
imbalance.
Despite the concerns raised above, truth commissions have a significant role in 
helping states go through a period of transition. Properly constructed, a truth 
commission can offer recognition of state crime, victims, perpetrators and 
bystanders; commissions often present the first step to justice. Truth commissions 
are heavily dependent on the way in which they are implemented and responded to 
by transitional states as well as the international community.
Objectives
How realistic is it that truth commissions can reconcile a post-conflict state when 
proponents will view formal prosecutions as the only way of moving forward and 
reconciling? At the very least commentators acknowledge that truth commissions 
offer some form of accountability even if they do not offer reconciliation.
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Truth commissions should also be expected to take positive steps to attempt to 
repair victims’ harm. Interviews with victims reveal that financial reparation is often 
less important to them than ‘emotional restoration” .256 In order for this restoration to 
happen and for truth commissions to have legitimacy and provide some form of 
accountability it is important that those involved with, and affected by the conflict, 
actively participate in the process. Some concern has been raised with regards to 
the cooperation of perpetrators, but offering amnesty as an incentive to engage is 
one option available to tackle this issue. It is important for a truth commission to 
uncover truth in order to aid the repairing of victims’ harm.257
Truth commissions raise the truth versus justice debate. Specifically, the question is 
whether the establishment of truth can provide justice, and with it, accountability. 
However, with many vested interests, mainly political, and the notion of victors’ 
justice, history is told by the victors and in turn can have an influence on the 
establishment of the ‘truth’.
In fact, is it the role of truth commissions to achieve justice and satisfy the 
requirement for both individual and institutional accountability. Truth commissions 
have a particular function within a post-conflict society, but should they be seen as 
fulfilling a multitude of roles?
Truth commissions should be devised and driven to pursue peace and promote 
reconciliation for a post-conflict state. The question this raises is how such a
256 H. Strang, Repair or Revenge: Victims and Restorative justice, (2003) Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, in D. Roche, Truth Commission Amnesties and the International Criminal Court,' (2005) 45 
British Journal of Criminology at 581.
257 D. Roche, Truth Commission Amnesties and the International Criminal Court1 (2005) 45 British 
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structure could be pursued. The very nature of truth commissions is that they are 
slow, due to the number of perpetrators and victims, and may cause more 
resentment and anger in the short term. However, if they are not allowed to function 
like this then they might be perceived as politicised, in which case they are counter­
productive.
One of the main concerns regarding amnesties is the perceived lack of 
accountability. However, coupling an amnesty with the truth commission has been 
said to 'assure accountability'.258 Perhaps it is dangerous to think that all truth 
commissions provide an assurance of achieving accountability. History shows us 
there is no simple answer for dealing with past wrong-doing in a post-conflict society. 
Whilst truth commissions have the capacity to achieve many of the needs and wants 
of such a society, however some commentators argue that the operations of truth 
commissions are hindered when the final reports are ignored by governments. 
Although, truth commissions do work if accountability is equated with recognition 
(even if the recommendations are ignored), but do not work if accountability is 
equated with the attribution of individual accountability.
A significant contributor to the debate on truth commissions is the experience of 
South Africa. Gibson has attempted to address the question as to whether or not 
‘truth’ has effectively reconciled the State.259 In addition a criticism of the TRC 
concerns the decision to individualise victims rather than allow them to stand as an
258 L.J. Laplante, 'Outlawing Amnesty: The Return of Criminal Justice in Transitional Justice 
Schemes,’ (2009) 49 Virginia Journal of International Law at 916.
259 J.L. Gibson, ‘Overcoming Apartheid: Can Truth Reconcile a Divided Nation?’ (2006) Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 603, Law, Society, and Democracy: Comparative 
Perspectives 82-110.
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entire community.260 However, truth commissions have the ability to provide some 
form of accountability to more victims, than say criminal trials, due to its’ greater 
capacity to address wrong-doing.
The discussion so far has alluded to truth commissions as a mechanism to achieve 
accountability. However, there are a number of criticisms of truth commissions 
relating to the fact truth commissions cannot possible provide redress for all.
Hayner argues truth commissions could be preferable to formal trials.261 In 
particular:
‘identify patterns of abuses, discover truth, reveal institutional failings that 
allowed the crimes to occur, take a broader view of human rights abuses’ and 
‘recommend institutional changes to prevent a recurrence of the crimes, 
whereas a trial focuses on the details of a specific incident.’
The process provides an important opportunity to establish a historical record whilst 
having the capacity to reduce the number of lies that can be circulated unchallenged. 
Truth commissions also seem better suited for atrocity committed on a large scale 
and provide a forum for remorse, forgiveness and potentially reconciliation.
Brahm acknowledges that ‘while prosecution remains desirable  sometimes,
there are practical reasons to forego trials.262 For instance, perpetrators often
260 M. Mamdani, 'Amnesty or Impunity? A Preliminary Critique of the Report of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of South Africa (TRC)’, (2002) 32 Diacritics 33-59.
261 261 P. Hayner, Unspeakable truths: Confronting state terror and atrocity (2001) New York:
Routledge in N. Dimitrijevic, 'Justice Beyond Blame: Moral Justification of (Thq Idea of) A Truth 
Commission,' (2006), 50(3) The Journal of Conflict Resolution at 373.
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remain too influential after the transition, the number of crimes committed too large, 
or the judicial system has either been co-opted or decimated during the recently 
ended conflict to make trials a feasible possibility.’ So whilst there is significant 
support for formal prosecutions, truth commissions are seen, to some, as a 
compromise.
There is an acknowledged difficulty in judging the successfulness of truth 
commissions. A number of other issues have been mentioned about a truth 
commission has no enforcement powers and avoids ‘real’ punishment. However, a 
truth commission can be designed in a way that can aid prosecutions, and lustration 
is a kind of punishment.
Truth commissions can facilitate closure for victims, by providing a narrative of 
events which can put an end to lies. They also provide opportunities for perpetrators 
to explain and answer for their conduct, thereby providing individual accountability, 
as well as institutional accountability through the added advantage of looking at the 
conflict from a broader perspective.
In fact, Phelps argues the story telling that takes place may well offer greater justice 
than efforts to prosecute and punish perpetrators of human rights abuses. While 
trials may trigger public discussion in certain cases, Phelps agrees with other 
observers who have argued that trials generally do not promote dialogue and
262 E. Brahm, ‘Uncovering the Truth: Examining Truth Commission Success and Impact’, (2007) 8 
International Studies Perspectives at 21.
discussion.263 Both of which are essential components for achieving accountability 
in a post-conflict society.
Truth commissions have the potential to be of great benefit in helping post­
conflict societies establish the facts about past human rights violations, foster 
accountability, preserve evidence, identify perpetrators and recommend 
reparations and institutional reforms. They can also provide a public platform 
for victims to address the nation directly with their personal stories and can 
facilitate public debate about how to come to terms with the past’.264
Grodsky states that truth commissions are a type of ‘compromise justice’ and put in 
place where the international and domestic pressures for criminal justice collide.265 
However, it seems Grodsky’s understanding of justice is limited to the legal 
understanding of justice. One which perhaps only equates justice with the 
prosecution and subsequent punishment of offenders, thereby viewing truth 
commissions as failing to provide an adequate response. Interestingly, as 
mentioned earlier, Hayner argues that the broader benefits of truth commissions in 
fact make them superior to criminal trials.266
263 T.G. Phelps, Shattered Voices: Language, Violence, and the World of Truth Commissions, 
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Summary
A post-conflict society is faced with a mix of both short-term and long-term goals. To 
achieve these goals it is imperative for a state to ‘focus on reconciliation and nation- 
building’.267 Truth commissions offer a ‘unique contribution’ to a post-conflict society 
in that it provides opportunities for victims’ voices to be heard on a much greater 
scale than a prosecution.268 This also helps produce a narrative through the account 
giving by perpetrators and witnesses, promotes reconciliation through the inclusion 
of all parties to the conflict, creates opportunities to address state wrong-doing and 
has the capacity to have a broad impact on a post-conflict state.
267 Review Conference of the Rome Statute, ‘Confronting Impunity: The role of Truth Commissions in 
Building Reconciliation and National Unity’, (2010) para.4. accessed via: http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en menus/asp/reviewconference/Paqes/review%20conference.aspx 
Ibid para.5.
Chapter Five: Prosecutions and the ICC
The Nuremberg and Tokyo International Military Tribunals were a turning point for 
the international community. After witnessing some of the worst atrocities in history, 
the international community would no longer allow perpetrators of the most heinous 
crimes to go unpunished and individuals would be held individually responsible for 
their actions. The prosecution of such individuals is a specific and dominant model 
of accountability. However, a number of issues arise from this model, specifically, 
the focus on a relative low number of high ranking individuals, the lengthy trials, the 
substantial amounts of evidence, the lack of attention to domestic models of criminal 
justice, the burden of proof on the prosecution, publicity, and the fact many 
international trials are held outside of the relevant state(s), which creates tensions 
between what happens during the trial and whether or not this resonates on the 
ground.
The international community is said to have a vested interest in the most serious 
violations of international criminal law as they affect mankind as a whole and the only 
way to work towards prevention of their recurrence is to send a clear message to 
those with political power and/or command responsibility that they will answer for 
their deeds.269 However, this assumes dictators are rational thinkers and fear what 
they are doing is wrong and would be called to answer.
Broomhall discusses the ‘Nuremberg Principles’, which have laid the foundations for 
international criminal law.270 These ‘Principles’ were the starting point of ‘...a new
269 M.C. Bassiouni, ‘Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for Accountability,’ (1996) 
59(4) Law and Contemporary Problems at 9.
270 B. Broomhall, International Justice & The International Criminal Court: Between Sovereignty and 
the Rule of Law, (2003) Oxford University Press.
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relationship between the individual, the State, and the international community...’.271 
The main premise is that crimes are committed by human beings, and as such, an 
individual no matter what their official position can, and will be, held accountable for 
their actions.
Mendez argues accountability can only be achieved through prosecutions and trials 
and the restoration of truth and establishing facts should not be at the expense of 
criminal prosecutions.272 However, a properly conducted criminal trial should 
function in a way which uncovers truth and provides a factual record of events: 
inherent within the process. Albeit, not necessarily comprehensive, but relatively 
extensive.
Much of the literature discussing the rationale behind punishment is concerned with 
two main themes: specifically, that of retribution and deterrence.273 Whilst in this 
legalistic and dominant model of accountability asserts the need to hold an individual 
accountable/answerable for their crimes with subsequent punishment, a wider 
question needs to be addressed. In this context, who are the defendants 
accountable to? It is generally accepted that for such heinous crimes the 
international community has a vested interested in holding perpetrators accountable 
and to the wider 'community'. More immediately, perpetrators should be held 
accountable to their own community, the community in which the wrong-doing has 
taken place, as in some African states.
Ibid at 19.
272 J.E. Mendez, 'Accountability for Past Abuses,' (1997) 19 (2) Human Rights Quarterly 255-282.
273 K. McEvoy and L. Mallinder, L. ‘Amnesties in Transition: Punishment, Restoration, and the 
Governance of Mercy,' (2012) 39(3) Journal of Law and Society at 416.
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The international community has now accepted that it is important to hold violators of 
international criminal law accountable for their actions. Many world leaders, 
international lawyers and human rights activists now believe it is not acceptable to 
allow perpetrators of atrocious crimes to go unpunished. The establishment of the 
ICC is a clear indication of this point. Particularly the Preamble which asserts the 
role of the ICC is to 'end impunity'. Prosecution and punishment, they argue, is 
essential to eliminate the notion of impunity and to deter current and future leaders 
from committing similar crimes and necessary to restore and maintain international 
peace and security.
In her article, Orentlicher discusses the questions over whether or not a new 
democratic society, which rises from the ashes of a prior regime, could ‘survive the 
destabilising effects of politically charged trials.’274 Orentlicher is referring to an 
important aspect of the difficult situations faced by states when emerging from 
conflict are unstable and rife with tension.
Ending hostilities and preventing the commission of future crimes, is a benefit to the 
international community. Although the international community has an interest in 
seeking justice and holding perpetrators of crimes accountable, this interest may 
yield to greater demands of preserving the lives of the innocent hence some 
‘tolerance’ of amnesty. What should be done when the quest for justice and 
retribution hampers the search for peace?
274 D. Orentlicher, ‘Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior
Regime’, (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal at 2546, in B. Chigara, Amnesty in International Law: The 
Legality under International Law of National Amnesty Laws. (2002) Longman, Pearson Education at 
18.
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What are the arguments for prosecution? Scholars, in particular, have argued that 
prosecutions are necessary to deter future violations of international criminal law.275 
Amnesties, they argue, may send a signal to ‘rogue’ regimes that they have nothing 
to lose by committing heinous crimes to further their political agenda. For example, 
Richard Goldstone, the former Prosecutor of the ICTY, concluded that the 
international community’s failure to prosecute dictators who had committed heinous 
crimes encouraged the Serbs to carry out their ethnic cleansing campaign with little 
fear of retribution.276 This notion of impunity presents a cost to the entire 
international community, not just the state in which the particular crimes occurred.
However, do prosecutions act as a deterrent in reality? In brief, there is no definite 
way to prove or disprove this theory due to the limited number of prosecutions.277 
The deterrence theory rests on three main assumptions; first, criminals are aware of 
the laws and the possible punishments; second, criminals weigh up the costs and 
benefits of their actions before committing a crime; and third, the risk of incarceration 
outweighs the benefits of committing the crime.278 Although, we may assume that 
individuals who commit human rights atrocities are aware their actions are illegal, the 
second and third assumptions are more problematic. However, they perhaps view 
the likelihood of being hauled before an international court as remote.
One type of accountability is served by the prosecutions of perpetrators which 
directly relates to punishment, but accountability in a broader sense provides for
276 M.P. Scharf, ‘From eXile files: An essay on trading justice for peace,’ (2006) 63 Washington and 
Lee Law Review at 349.
277 C. Slobogin , ‘Civilization of the Criminal Law,’ (2005) 58 Vanderbilt Law Review at 141.
278 P.H. Robinson and J.M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: 
At Its Worst When Doing its Best,’ (2003) 91 Georgetown Law Journal at 953.
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other mechanisms as discussed in previous chapters. In this context, Akhavan 
describes the opposing views as those that originate from ‘judicial romantics’ and 
‘political realists’.279 One type of accountability is served by prosecution and is 
related to punishment, but not all types of accountability are achieved in this way. 
Those proponents of the prosecution and punishment of perpetrators are what 
Akhavan calls ‘judicial romantics’. Whilst those, which accept alternatives also play 
an important part in providing accountability for atrocity, and moreover, acknowledge 
the limitations of criminal trials, are called ‘political realists’.280
Charles Taylor and the Special Court for Sierra Leone
Another significant point in history was the prosecution of Charles Taylor, the former 
president of Liberia. The first head of an African state to be brought before an 
international tribunal and as mentioned by Rodman '...an important step in ending 
the culture of impunity in which tyrants and rebel leaders believe they will never be 
held accountable for their crimes.'281 The significance of the Charles Taylor trial for 
the ICC is that it illustrates the issues with enforcement of the law to end impunity via 
prosecutions and the ‘...political requirements of negotiating an end to armed 
conflict', which is also important during a period of transition.
International Criminal Court
One of the main objectives of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is that '...the 
most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not
279 P. Akhavan, ‘Are International Criminal Tribunals a Disincentive to Peace?: Reconciling Judicial 
Romanticism with Political Realism,’ (2009) 31(3) Human Rights Quarterly 624-654.
280 Ibid
281 K.A. Rodman, 'Is Peace in the interests of justice? The case for broad prosecutorial discretion at 
the International Criminal Court.' (2009) 22(1) Leiden Journal of International Law at 99.
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go unpunished.'282 This fits with Akhavan’s idea of ‘judicial romantics’ and, as 
perhaps could be expected, views prosecutions and the attribution guilt and 
punishment as the main way of addressing wrong-doing.
A first glance the ICC’s website provides the impression of action being taken in 
several states. Whilst the Court is engaged in prosecuting individuals for serious 
violations of international criminal law, questions arise concerning the effectiveness 
and efficiency of such prosecutions.
Within the international fora the ICC stands as a beacon of accountability. Heralding 
a stark warning by holding individuals accountable for their crimes by assuming 
responsibility for investigating and prosecuting violations of international criminal law 
where states at national level are unable or unwilling.283
Holtermann 284 states that whilst the ICC Preamble signals an importance of 
prosecuting perpetrators, that within the Statute ‘...a few articles could be interpreted 
so as to leave open the possibility of respecting amnesties.’ 285 In context, 
Holtermann’s discussion focuses on the arguments surrounding restorative justice 
which include measures such as conditional amnesties granted by Truth 
Commissions.
282 ICC Statute Preambular para. 4.
283 Article 17 of the Rome Statute 1998.
284 J.V.H. Holtermann, The End of ‘the end of impunity’? The International Criminal Court and the 
Challenge from Truth Commissions,’ (2010) 16 Res Publica 209-225.
285 Ibid at 212
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Complementarity of the ICC
There is a trend in international criminal law which favours domestic over 
international courts, with international justice being deemed appropriate only when a 
national solution is not possible. This could be due to a number of reasons, but 
include situations where a state lacks the necessary legal infrastructure and 
resources to undertake mass criminal trials. This is more recently evidenced by the 
principle of complementarity of the ICC. Commenting on the importance and 
significance of the complementarity principle, John Holmes states: ‘[t]he 
complementarity regime is one of the cornerstones on which the future of
International Criminal Court will be built Such a system would reinforce the
primary obligation of States to prevent and prosecute genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes ,286
In lieu of any definition of complementarity in the ICC Statute our attention is drawn 
to the 10th Preambular paragraph which states; 'the International Criminal Court 
established under this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal 
jurisdiction.' The ICC Statute imposes an obligation on states to prosecute those 
crimes which fall within the Statute and to hold those responsible to account for their 
actions. El Zeidy states the reason behind the principle of complementarity is 'to 
preserve the ICC’s power over irresponsible States that refuse to prosecute those 
who have committed heinous international crimes.'287
286 J.T. Holmes, The Principle of Complementarity, in THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE, 
Supra note 2, at 73-74.
287 M.M. El Zeidy, M.M. The Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery to Implement 
International Criminal Law,’ (2002) 23 Michigan Journal of International Law at 869.
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The ICC co-exists with national courts and it has the ability to do this because of the 
principle of complementarity. In contrast the ad hoc Tribunals are based on the 
principle of primacy. The combatant states are effectively kept at arms’ length, 
because either they are implicated or because they are unable to offer a suitably 
stable and secure home for the Courts. In essence courts must, by definition, have 
distance from those they are judging because judicial accountability is blind, impartial 
and answers to no-one other than the will of the international community as it is 
expressed in law.
The ICC will take jurisdiction over a matter where national courts are ‘unwilling’ or 
‘unable’ pursuant to Article 17 of the Statute. However, how easy is it for the ICC to 
establish whether a state is unwilling or indeed, unable in order for it to be merely 
complementary? This is partly due to a codification of the customary international 
law around universal jurisdiction and crimes against humanity. So if the OTP issues 
an arrest warrant then the obligation is on the state..
Article 53
Article 53 of the Rome Statute provides discretion to the Prosecutor by, theoretically 
at least, allowing the Prosecutor to abstain from investigating and prosecuting when 
in ‘the interests of justice’. The Rome Statute fails to define the term, which has led 
many to question whether this has been deliberately omitted to encourage ambiguity 
and promote creative interpretation by the Prosecutor, which could possibly lead to 
acceptance of alternatives to prosecutions.288 However, any decision made by the
288 K.A. Rodman, ‘Is peace in the interests of justice? The case for broad prosecutorial discretion at
the International Criminal Court,’ (2009) 22(1) Leiden Journal of International Law 99-126.
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Prosecutor to postpone an investigation or prosecution, or to decide not to proceed, 
is reviewable by the Pre-Trial Chamber.289
The ICC Prosecutor exercised his discretion to suspend investigations in Uganda. 
Although, temporarily allowing a suspension in order to give peace negotiations an 
opportunity to succeed is not the same as sanctioning immunity and alternatives to 
prosecutions, such as blanket amnesties.290
Fish argues the most noticeable action taken by the ICC has been in Uganda since 
the Prosecutor issued the first arrest warrant against a current head of state.291 The 
ICC actively engaged with peace negotiations between the guerrilla fighters known 
as the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) and the Ugandan government. Once the ICC 
has indicted alleged perpetrators there is currently no real discretion to suspend the 
indictments to allow for peace talks.292 This created unease between both sides 
and undermined the process of negotiation. After all, why would the LRA leaders 
agree to end the conflict if they were still subject to the ICC's indictment?
The President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, after referring the LRA to the ICC 
decided to do two things for the cessation of hostilities. Firstly, offering amnesty to 
the LRA and secondly, contacting the ICC to request the indictments were 
withdrawn. The ICC declined to withdraw the issued indictments.293
291 E.S. Fish, 'Peace Through Complementarity: Solving the Ex Post Problem in International Criminal 
Court Prosecutions,' (2010) 119 The Yale Law Journal at 1703.
292 Ibid at 1705.
293 Ibid at 1706.
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Finally an agreement between the LRA and the Ugandan government was reached, 
which involved the LRA leaders being prosecuted in the Ugandan courts with a 
promise of lenient sentences. The idea was to prevent the ICC from exercising 
jurisdiction under Article 17. However, after further discourse with the ICC, the 
Prosecutor for the ICC stated any arrest warrant for the LRA must be executed in 
spite of the fact measures had already been taken. The question at this point is 
whether this is a stance based on procedural issues with the Statute in terms of no 
discretion to recall an indictment or for allowing leniency in sentence; or a clear 
indication of the ICC fulfilling its mandate of ending impunity? In any event, one of 
the most senior officials within the LRA, Kony, failed to attend his trial and continued 
fighting. Commentators within the international field such as Fish question whether 
the LRA ever had the intention to stop fighting, but used the negotiations as a tactic 
to delay the execution of the arrest warrants and provide an opportunity for 
violence.294 If such assertions are true, perhaps the ICC's determination to see the 
execution of the arrest warrants was the right one.
There is much discourse within the international fora regarding peace versus justice. 
In fact, the International Federation for Human Rights stated ‘...that victims and 
affected populations have an inherent right to peace as well as to justice’.295 
Moreover, the two are not mutually exclusive and should benefit one another.
294 F. Mugabe, Uganda: Army Ready To Attack LRA Rebels, New Vision (Uganda), 15th June 2008, 
available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200806160001 .html in E.S. Fish, 'Peace Through 
Complementarity: Solving the Ex Post Problem in International Criminal Court Prosecutions,1 (2010) 
119 The Yale Law Journal at 1707.
295 International Federation for Human Rights, ICC Review Conference: Renewing Commitment to 
Accountability, 25 May 2010, N°543a, last accessed 12/11/2012, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4bfcc04e2.html
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Concerns over formal prosecutions
In spite of the increased determination to prosecute violators of international criminal 
law, Blattman and Bowman raise a number of concerns with regards to prosecutions 
in the pursuit of accountability.296 These concerns include the reliance on state co­
operation, for example with the enforcement of arrest warrants and preservation of 
evidence, which highlight the inherently political nature of prosecutions. A further 
concern is the safety of investigators on the ground in a particular state. A final 
observation pertains to the delays, procedural challenges that all add to the length of 
a trial. Whiting argues that ‘...swift justice is more certain justice’.297 In fact, the on­
going saga during Slobodan Milosevic's trial meant he was able to delay proceedings 
so significantly that he died before the completion of the trial. Whilst the victims and 
their families were denied a verdict the trial did mark a new era for international 
prosecutions. This leads to the question of whether or not accountability was 
achieved for his victims and the wider community. In Chapter 1, accountability was 
defined as the explaining and answering for conduct, but the trial of Milosevic 
provided no real explanation and he was never held to answer for his involvement in 
the atrocity carried out in the Former Yugoslavia.
Truth
The important role truth plays in a post-conflict society has already been discussed 
in previous chapters. Truth serves a multitude of purposes which include the ability 
to promote social healing, promote justice, establish a historical record, to educate
296 R. Blattmann and K. Bowman, 'Achievements and problems of the International Criminal Court: a 
view from within,' (2008) 6(4) Journal of International Criminal Justice 711-730.
297 A. Whiting, ‘In International Criminal Prosecutions, Justice Delayed Can Be,Justice Delivered,’ 
(2009) 50 Harvard International Law Journal at 323.
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and promote democracy. All relevant to a society faced with the need to address 
past wrong-doing.
Discussing the Eichmann Trial, Koskenniemi states that ‘the trial was held to be 
necessary in order to bring to publicity the full extent of the horrors of the Nazi war 
against the Jews’.298 However, concerns were raised on the notion of victors’ justice 
as there were no trials for the Allied Parties. Whilst the Eichmann trial opens up 
many avenues, which are beyond the scope of this discussion, the state was indeed 
‘willing and able’ to prosecute and it did. The trial was an opportunity for many 
victims to tell their story, so much so that it really ceased to be prosecution at all but 
ended up more like a truth commission and execution. Everyone within Israel was 
happy to see Eichmann convicted and executed, but very many people outside Israel 
were unhappy with the trial becoming a forum for Israel to create a ‘founding 
myth’.299
The Resolutions establishing the ICTY and ICTR do not list the ascertainment of the 
truth as one of the objectives of these tribunals. Their Statutes also make no 
reference to the ascertainment of the truth as an objective of international criminal 
justice. However, surely some aspect of uncovering truth is inherent in the process 
of a trial. The inclusion of evidence and witness testimony are all inherent within a 
criminal trial. In fact, criminal trials perhaps allow for a ‘tested truth’, a truth which is 
open to challenge from either the prosecutor or defence counsel. The concern with 
the truth-ascertaining function of a criminal trial is that it perhaps is a constructed
298 M. Koskenniemi, ‘Between Impunity and Show Trials,’ (2002) 6 Max Planck Yearbook of United 
Nations Law at 3.
299 Ibid at 22.
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truth, which has been moulded and formed around a legal argument, thereby 
impacting on the full extent of truth that can be uncovered.
In spite of any explicit reference to the ascertainment of truth within the Resolutions 
for the ICTY and ICTR, the need for truth has gained prominence amongst lawyers, 
politicians and scholars. For example, Ms Albright has said Truth is the cornerstone 
of the rule of law, and it will point towards individuals, not peoples, as perpetrators of 
war crimes. And it is only the truth that can cleanse the ethnic and religious hatreds 
and begin the healing process’300, thereby acknowledging the importance of truth.
In fact, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the ICTY and ICTR were subject to 
amendment and now include a truth-ascertaining function to the Tribunal. Truth is 
referred to in:
‘Rule 90(F)(i) The Trial Chamber shall exercise control over the mode and 
order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to:
(i) Make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of 
the truth...’301
There are a number of controls that are necessary to constrain defendants using the 
Court for extensive and endless rhetoric and self-justificatory speeches.
The importance of ascertaining the truth was also expressed in Prosecutor v
Akayesu in which the ICTR made it clear the objective is ‘to establish the truth in its
300 UN Doc. S/RES/827, 25 May 1993, Record on Debate on Resolution 827, accessed via:
http://untreatv.un.ora/cod/avl/ha/ictv/ictv.html 
State the rules of evidence?
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judgment,’302 Whilst many commentators argue truth ascertained during a trial is a 
‘contested truth’, it leaves others questioning exactly how much truth can be 
established with the limited capacity of trials to hear testimony from all those 
involved. It is in fact the adversarial nature of such trials that impedes the truth- 
ascertaining function and perhaps a move towards an inquisitorial system would help 
alleviate the influence of lawyer’s account-making on the truths being told.
It was not until the establishment of the ICC that an explicit statement has been 
made in the founding Statute with regards to the ascertainment of truth. Specifically, 
Article 54(1 )(a) of the Rome Statute states the Prosecutor shall ‘[i]n order to 
establish the truth, extend the investigation to cover all facts and evidence relevant 
to an assessment of whether there is criminal responsibility under this Statute, and, 
in doing so, investigate incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally.’ In 
addition, Article 69(3) of the Rome Statute states that ‘[t]he Court shall have the 
authority to request the submission of all evidence that it considers necessary for the 
determination of the truth’. The first read of this section implies the ICC is concerned 
with ascertainment of the truth, one which is not moulded and adjusted to support a 
legal argument, but one which seeks the full truth. However, as mentioned 
previously, the adversarial nature of the trial will impact on the evidence presented at 
court, and therefore, the quality and extent of the truth established.
Whilst the level and extent of the ‘truth’ which is uncovered by criminal trials is 
questionable, the Rome Statute and the interpretations of the provisions have left no 
room for disputing that the truth-ascertaining function is a core objective of the ICC.
302 Prosecutor v Akayesu, T. Ch. I. Judgment, ICTR-95-4-T, 2 September 1998, para.131.
109
The same can be said in respect of the ICTY and ICTR inspite of the silence on the 
ascertainment of the truth in their Resolutions.
Justice
A further argument in favour of prosecution relates to the issue that some 
alternatives, such as amnesties, deprive victims of the right to seek justice. Whilst it 
is accepted that all people have certain fundamental rights, including the right to 
justice, the right to judicial protection, and the right to a fair remedy.303 Criminal trials 
are necessary to honour these fundamental rights as well as to 'give significance to 
the [victims’] suffering'.304 In addition to upholding these rights, prosecutions may 
help restore the victims’ dignity, serve as a truth finding mechanism, and provide the 
necessary evidence to permit victims to recover damages in civil courts.
Beyond the rights of the actual victims and their families, this argument asserts, that 
some alternatives deprive the rest of humanity of the opportunity to seek justice. In 
both our domestic and international legal systems, it seems to be the notion that 
crimes do not only affect the aggrieved person, but the entire community. The 
international community has an interest in prosecuting crimes that offend the norms 
of all mankind regardless of the specific victims’ wishes. On this basis, amnesties 
and truth commissions, as an alternative to prosecutions, prevent humanity from 
seeking this level of retribution. The broader question is whether the international 
community should be focused on retribution, but instead concentrates on
303R.C. Slye, The Legitimacy of Amnesties Under International Law and General Principles of Anglo- 
American Law: Is a Legitimate Amnesty Possible?’ (2002) 43 Virginia Journal of International Law at 
191.
304 M.P. Scharf, 'Swapping Amnesties for Peace: Was There a Duty to Prosecute International Crimes 
in Haiti?’ (1998) 31(1) Texas International Law Journal at 14.
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establishing a fuller truth, reconciling a divided state and acknowledging all those 
affected by the conflict.
It has also been asserted that alternatives may undermine the transition to 
democracy and to the establishment of the rule of law.305 If criminals from a prior 
regime are not brought to justice, the prevailing notion of impunity may undermine 
the establishment of democratic institutions. Likewise, if citizens perceive that 
criminals are not held accountable for their actions, they are more likely to disregard 
the law themselves, further undermining the establishment of the rule of law.306 
Lawlessness leads to more lawlessness, encourages disrespect for legal institutions, 
and increases the probability of vigilante justice.307 Finally, the absence of any form 
of prosecution may fuel fears that a prior regime may come back to power, further 
undermining attempts to reconcile the country. Prosecuting criminals may reduce 
the community’s fears and provide a sense of stability and security for a new 
democratic regime. These are arguments made by ‘judicial romantics’ who fail to 
acknowledge the limitations of trials. They can be slow and cumbersome, selective 
in terms of situations, perpetrators and the evidence used during the trials. In fact, 
such statements concerned with the necessity of criminal trials epitomise the 
concern by Drumbl regarding the tensions that exist between the unrealistic 
expectations placed on international criminal law and what it can realistically 
achieve.
305 D. Orentlicher, ’Settling Accounts: The Duty To Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior 
Regime' (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal at 2542.
306 D.M. Kahan, ‘Between Economics and Sociology: The New Path of Deterrence,’ (1997) 95 
Michigan Law Review at 2486.
307 D. Orentlicher, 'Settling Accounts: The Duty To Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior 
Regime' (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal at 2542.
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Criminal trials are principally concerned with ‘the allocation of guilt and imposition of 
punishment’.308 The primary concern for trials is the individualisation of guilt and at 
the very heart of such a mechanism is retribution and through this approach, justice 
is achieved. Legal commentators have argued that ‘justice delayed is justice denied’ 
with the rationale behind this position concerned with the impact of delays on 
trials.309 However, Whiting has sought to address this position.310 Whiting argues 
there is a widely accepted desire to expedite trials, which many view as justice being 
done, but discusses on the other hand, ‘[international criminal cases that
excessively expedited can lose credibility and can be perceived as failures, thus
undercutting the very goals that they are trying to serve.’311
The First Annual Report of the ICTY reaffirms the mandate of the Tribunal which is 
‘to do justice, to deter further crimes and to contribute to the restoration and the 
maintenance of peace.’ 312 Whilst the ICTR Resolution refers to an additional 
objective, namely, its contribution to the process of national reconciliation.313 On the 
other hand, the ICTY Resolution does not explicitly refer to reconciliation as an 
objective, but a number of judgments have nonetheless referred to such an 
objective.314 For instance, in Deronjic, the Chamber held that ‘[tjruth and justice 
should also foster a sense of reconciliation between different ethnic groups within the
308 J. Doak, The Therapeutic Dimension of Transitional Justice: Emotional Repair and Victim 
Satisfaction in International Trials and Truth Commissions’, (2011) 11 International Criminal Law 
Review at 280.
309 A. Whiting, 'In International Criminal Prosecutions, Justice Delayed Can Be Justice Delivered' 
(2009) 50 Harvard International Law Journal at 323.
1^0 Ibid
311 A. Whiting, 'In International Criminal Prosecutions, Justice Delayed Can Be Justice Delivered.' 
(2009) 50 Harvard International Law Journal at 323.
M.C. Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law (1999) 2nd Edition, Kluwer 
Law International (The Hague/London/Boston) at 236.
313 UN Doc. S/RES/955, 8 November 1994.
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countries of the former Yugoslavia’.315 In Erdemovic, the Trial Chamber stated
that efforts to end impunity ‘would contribute to appeasement and give the chance to 
the people who were solely afflicted to mourn those among them who had been 
unjustly killed’.316 However, criticism particularly focused on the ICTY has been rife 
with regards to concerns over the selectivity of prosecutions and the use of plea- 
bargaining.
More recently, the ICC has affirmed the right to justice for victims, which was defined 
as follows: “victims’ interests in the identification prosecution and punishment of 
those who have victimised them by preventing their impunity. When the right to 
justice is to be satisfied through criminal proceedings, victims have a central interest 
in the outcome of such proceedings leading to the identification, prosecution and 
punishment of those who have victimised them. Accordingly, victims have a 
personal and core interest in the determination of guilt or innocence of the persons 
charged.’317
The ICTY Resolution does not explicitly refer to reconciliation as an objective,318 but 
a number of judgments have nonetheless referred to such an objective. For 
instance, in Deronjic, the Chamber held that ‘[tjruth and justice should also foster a
sense of reconciliation between different ethnic groups within the countries of the
former Yugoslavia’.319 In Erdemovic, the Trial Chamber stated that efforts to end 
impunity ‘would contribute to appeasement and give the chance to the people who
315 Prosecutor v. Deronjic, T. Ch. Judgment on sentence, IT-02-61-T, 30 March 2004, para.133.
316 Sentencing Judgment, IT-96-22-T. 29 November 1996, para.65.
317 Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo, P.T. Ch. Public Urgent Decision on the Set Procedural Rights 
Attached to procedural Status of Victim at the Pre-Trial Stage of the Case, ICC-01/04-01/07-474, 13 
May 2008, paras. 39-42, footnote 102.
318 UN Doc. S/RES/808, 22 February 1993.
319 Prosecutor v. Deronjic, T. Ch. Judgment on sentence, IT-02-61-T, 30 March 2004, para.133.
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were solely afflicted to mourn those among them who had been unjustly killed’.320 
The ICTY has been plagued by a number of criticisms by lawyers, politicians and 
scholars. Firstly, the issue of selectivity with regards to the ICTY targeting a 
particular group. Further criticisms have been raised with regards to the common 
use of plea-bargaining.
Recognition
Recently the International Criminal Court announced a formal plan to provide victims 
with reparations. It comes to light after the recent conviction of Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo for war crimes.321 The Trust Fund for Victims (TFV) provides a mechanism for 
distributing money to victims as a way of reparation. According to a recent press 
release The TFV addresses and responds to the physical, psychological, or material 
needs of the most vulnerable victims'.322 In addition, these reparations provide a 
form of recognition for victims, but only to those victims identified by the ICC. It also 
assumes that monetary reparations are a way of helping to reconcile those most 
directly affected, but what about the wider community and those victims not 
identified? This leads to selective accountability for those selected to air their 
testimonies in court.
This results in the individualisation of victims when the very nature of the crime may 
have been against a collective group. For example, the fact that crimes against 
humanity encompass particular groups who might have been, collectively, the victim
320 Sentencing Judgment, IT-96-22-T, 29 November 1996.
321 The Prosecutor v.Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, accessed via: http://www.icc- 
cpi.int/en menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200104/related%20cas 
es/icc%200104%200106/Paqes/democratic%20republic%20of%20the%20conao.aspx
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of attacks means that the international community is eager to seek recognition and 
protection for groups, not just as a composite of individuals.
The recent trial and conviction of Charles Taylor has provided some accountability, 
but has failed to provide recognition for a large number of victims.323 Outside the 
Court the news reporters showed images of Taylor’s victims most of whom had their 
limbs hacked off with machetes. Victims are still living in poverty with limited health 
care and essential supplies. Although, at the very least the Court recognised Taylor 
was responsible and held to account, albeit for a charge of aiding and abetting,324 
and this in turn must provide some acknowledgement that there are victims. This 
could loosely be deemed some form of recognition, but surely recognition should go 
further and impact upon the lives of the victims.
The OTP has to make difficult decisions about which charges will stand up in court 
and not overburden the charge sheet to make sure the trial is expeditious. This 
inevitably means some victims will be short-changed (truth), but that is balanced 
against a good prosecutorial strategy (justice).
Prosecutions do encounter a number of obstacles and risk becoming show trials as 
in the case of Milosevic, which potentially risk de-legitimising the process.325 Whilst 
making a mockery of the institution, the more important focus should be on the 
victims and/or their families. The delays caused through the refusal to accept the
323 Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, 30 May 2012, SCSL-03-01-T, accessed via: http://www.sc- 
sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=U6xCITNa4tY%3d&tabid=107
324 Special Court for Sierra Lecne Press Release, Charles Taylor Convicted on all 11 Counts, 26 April 
2012 accessed via: http://www.sc-sl.orq/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=bv3HPDDiFTM%3d&tabid=232
325 M. Koskenniemi, ‘Between Impunity and Show Trials,’ (2002) 6 Max Planck Yearbook of United 
Nations Law at 32-35.
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court's jurisdiction, continual denials and lack of acknowledgement have further 
repercussions for those directly affected by the actions of the defendant.
The practicalities of carrying out prosecutions may result in the most senior leaders 
being held accountable for atrocity, but fails to address all involved. The limited 
nature of participants will also have an impact on the narrative that can be adduced 
through trial. This selectivity diminishes the quest for accountability and raises a 
number of questions on whether victims and their families are satisfied knowing that 
leaders who orchestrated the atrocity had been held accountable, rather than the 
individual pulling the trigger, or planting explosives that has blown off the victims 
limbs.
Summary
This chapter has explored the role of prosecutions in relation to ascertaining truth, 
providing justice and recognition with a view to understand the role such 
prosecutions play in providing accountability. There are a number of concerns when 
it comes to accountability and prosecutions. Firstly, the unrealistic expectations 
placed on criminal trials. Second, the practical difficulties, impact of selectivity and 
the repercussions for accountability. Third, the complex issues faced by a post­
conflict state go beyond law.
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Chapter Six: Discussion on the issues
It is the author’s view that responding to atrocity within a state has no one size fits all 
answer when it comes to an accountability mechanism. Each conflict has its own 
political and social dynamics and it is perhaps the case that accountability is 
indissolubly tied to political and social reality. This links with Akhavan’s notion of the 
‘political realists’.326 Neither the alternative mechanisms nor prosecutions fit with 
what Rubenstein describes as a ‘standard model’ of accountability as mentioned in 
Chapter 1.327 In which case, lustration might be the very best form of accountability: 
certain people lose their power, whilst society gets on with rebuilding without public 
focus on divisive debates.
The discussion thus far has explored the mechanisms available to post-conflict 
societies, and their struggles to deal with the past, as a means of pursuing 
accountability. It seems that out of the mechanisms discussed, Drumbl is correct in 
his assertion that prosecutions often become the default setting when either states 
themselves or the international community as a whole are faced with dealing with the 
most heinous crimes.328 This is, at least, a departure from the classic assumption 
that internal or external conflict is exclusively a matter for sovereign states.
The Special Court of Sierra Leone stated '...there is a crystallising international norm 
that a government cannot grant amnesty for serious violations of crimes under 
international law'.329 The statement by the Special Court of Sierra Leone is what 
prompts Drumbl’s fears about having an overreliance on the criminal law to provide
326 P. Akhavan, ‘Are International Criminal Tribunals a Disincentive to Peace?: Reconciling Judicial 
Romanticism with Political Realism,’ (2009) 31(3) Human Rights Quarterly at 625.
327J. Rubenstein, 'Accountability in an Unequal World,' (2007), 69 (3) The Journal of Politics at 616.
328 M. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment and International Law (2007) Cambridge University Press
329 Prosecutor v Kallon and Kamara, Special Court of Sierra Leone, A.Ch. 13.3.2004 para.82.
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accountability in extraordinary circumstances. States want justice done and seen to 
be done, even if that means having a minimal, reactive, international legal regime; if 
there is an emerging norm around amnesties then this too is a contribution to the 
international legal order, even if extraordinary crimes seem to require bespoke 
responses.
Truth
The establishment of the truth is both a requirement and necessity when holding an 
individual or institution to account. It was Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson at 
Nuremberg who emphasised the importance of establishing a narrative detailing the 
full extent of the conflict.330 An accurate and fulsome narrative demands parties on 
all sides enter into a discourse and provide an account of their actions, inactions or 
experiences.
The discussion has focused on the merits of using conditional amnesties as outlined 
in Chapter 3. Conditional amnesties require individuals to engage with a truth- 
ascertaining process as part of the agreement to grant amnesties. Whilst many pro­
prosecution commentators, like Orentlicher331 and Ricoeur,332 effectively demand the
330 Report from Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chief of Counsel for the United States in the Prosecution 
of Axis War Criminals, to the President (June 7,1945) 39 American Journal of International Law at 
178, 184 (Supp. 1945) in M.P. Scharf, ‘From eXile files: An essay on trading justice for peace,’ (2006) 
63 Washington and Lee Law Review 339-376 accessed via:
http://scholarlvcommons.law.wlu.edu/cqi/viewcontent.cqi?article=1140&context=wlulr&sei- 
redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.qooqle.co.uk%2Furl%3Fsa%3Dt%26rct%3Di%26a%3Dscharf 
%2520exile%26source%3Dweb%26cd%3D1%26ved%3D0CC4QFiAA%26url%3Dhttp%253A%252F 
%252Fscholarlvcommons.law.wlu.edu%252Fcqi%252Fviewcontent.cqi%253Farticle%253D1140%25 
26context%253Dwlulr%26ei%3DX5HAULKcPliA4qSN2YC4Aw%26usq%3DAFQiCNEN71lqEhNMv1 
wtQZZq BJdDqqZfQ#search=%22scharf%20exile%22
331 D. Orentlicher, 'Settling Accounts: The Duty To Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior 
Regime' (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 2585-93.
332 P. Ricoeur, Memory, history, forgetting (2004) University of Chicago Press
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prosecution of perpetrators of past wrong-doing, some others such as Drumbl,333 
Mallinder and McEvoy argue that conditional amnesties have the capacity to provide 
accountability to victims and the wider community due to the extent of the truth that 
can be uncovered.334 Perpetrators are perhaps more open and honest as to their 
wrong-doing knowing they are protected from prosecution. Whereas if perpetrators 
live in fear of facing prosecutions for their misconduct they are more likely to censor 
the extent of their truth-telling for fear it would be used against them during trial.
Arguably both prosecutions and truth commissions seek to reconstruct facts with the 
main difference being a truth commission does not involve criminal prosecutions and 
often include an amnesty.335 One of the benefits of a truth commission is the focus 
on producing a report containing an official version of events. However, it seems the 
focus of international criminal justice is on the allocation of guilt, thereby making the 
primary purpose retributive. So whilst a trial may provide a contested truth, the full 
extent of the truth is limited due to the adversarial nature of criminal trials. Whereas, 
a truth commission can provide a holistic truth, one which could perhaps stand the 
test of time.
Hayner discusses the difficulty of States when dealing with the dilemma of 
addressing past abuses through prosecutions or granting amnesty in the pursuit of 
the cessation of hostilities and the emergence of a new democratic regime.336
333 M. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment and International Law (2007) Cambridge University Press
334 For example see; L. Mallinder and K. McEvoy, ‘Rethinking amnesties: atrocity, accountability and 
impunity in post-conflict societies’, (2011) 6(1) Contemporary Social Science 107-128.
335 M. Koskenniemi, ‘Between Impunity and Show Trials' (2002) 6 Max Planck Yearbook of United 
Nations Law
336 P.B. Hayner, ‘Fifteen Truth Commissions -  1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study’, (1994) 16(4) 
Human Rights Quarterly at 597, in B. Chigara, Amnesty in International Law: The Legality under 
International Law of National Amnesty Laws. (2002) Longman, Pearson Education at 19.
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Hayner states ‘[i] used to feel very strongly that truth needs to come out. But there 
are others here that don’t feel that way; they feel that it is most important to focus on 
the elimination of future abuses...’.337
Criminal trials do provide a contested truth, but due to the adversarial nature of such 
trials, is one which fits with the prosecutions' legal argument, whilst the defence 
counsel aim to challenge the 'truth' in a way which works in their own favour. Such a 
system only provides for a limited amount of account-giving by both perpetrators and 
victims. For example, the Prosecutorial Strategy mentioned in Chapter 5 makes it 
clear that the Office of the Prosecutor will prioritise the investigations and 
prosecutions of those most responsible, in addition the accused are unlikely to 
incriminate themselves through their own testimony which, again, hinders the extent 
of account making and, for example, censors their responses to questions under 
cross examination. The account-giving by victims is also limited, not only for 
practical reasons and the number of victims that are successfully identified, but also 
the process is perhaps intimidating, even alien, for some victims and witnesses.
Justice
Scharf observed that the reality of situations in which atrocities take place frequently 
present the need to negotiate to end conflicts and prevent further crimes long before 
one can even think of bringing perpetrators to justice.338 In this vein, the initiation of
^ibid
338 M.P. Scharf, ‘From eXile files: An essay on trading justice for peace,’ (2006) 63 Washington and 
Lee Law Review 339-376 accessed via:
http://scholarlvcommons.law. wlu.edu/cqi/viewcontent.cqi?article=1140&context=wlulr&sei- 
redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.gooale.co.uk%2Furl%3Fsa%3Dt%26rct%3Di%26a%3Dscharf 
%2520exile%26source%3Dweb%26cd%3D1%26ved%3D0CC4QFiAA%26url%3Dhttp%253A%252F 
%252Fscholarlvcommons.law.wlu.edu%252Fcai%252Fviewcontent.cai%253Farticle%253D1140%25 
26context%253Dwlulr%26ei%3DX5HAULKcPliA4aSN2YC4Aw%26usq%3DAFQiCNEN71laEhNMv1 
wtQZZq BJdDqqZfQ#search=%22scharf%20exile%22
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prosecutions and threat of widespread prosecutions in a post-conflict society, which 
has been subject to a complex transition, can potentially lead to uprise and protests 
from supporters of those on trial and further retaliation. So to insist perpetrators be 
brought to justice through the use of prosecutions would be to prolong a conflict and 
thus increase the number of crimes committed.339
The cessation of conflict often requires negotiation to prevent further crimes long 
before anyone can even think of bringing perpetrators to justice.340 In fact, in his 
article, Scharf argues the default position of insisting on prosecutions can enable 
conflicts to continue.341
Amnesties and truth commissions have the potential to provide a more fulsome 
account of events as well as the potential to help facilitate the process of lustration. 
This provides an additional dimension to the benefit of amnesties, over prosecutions.
The demand for accountability and the seeking of justice seem to stem from the 
international community’s need to demonstrate leadership and foster the rule of law 
nationally, regionally and internationally. The narrow scope of the ICC which 
focuses on African states does pose some problems with regards to the perceived 
selectivity issues.
339 M.L. Wade, ‘Genocide: The Criminal Law between Truth and Justice,’ (2009) 19(2) International 
Criminal justice Review at 157.
340 M.P. Scharf, ‘From eXile files: An essay on trading justice for peace,’ (2006) 63 Washington and 
Lee Law Review 339-376 accessed via:
http://scholarlvcommons.law. wlu.edu/cai/viewcontent.cgi?article=1140&context=wlulr&sei- 
redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.qooale.co.uk%2Furl%3Fsa%3Dt%26rct%3Di%26q%3Dscharf 
%2520exile%26source%3Dweb%26cd%3D1%26ved%3D0CC4QFiAA%26url%3Dhttp%253A%252F 
%252Fscholarlvcommons.law.wlu.edu%252Fcqi%252Fviewcontent.cqi%253Farticle%253D1140%25 
26context%253Dwlulr%26ei%3DX5HAULKcPliA4qSN2YC4Aw%26usq%3DAFQiCNEN71lqEhNMv1
wtQZZq BJdDqqZfQ#search=%22scharf%20exile%22
341 Ibid
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Recognition
Prosecutions do provide recognition of past wrong-doing as well as those individuals 
most responsible for past wrong-doing. However, due to the limited nature of 
criminal trials and their inherent selectivity of those most responsible and the number 
of witnesses that can participate, this hinders the extent to which recognition can be 
provided. Limited recognition can be provided through guilty verdicts and the 
awarding of reparations to identified victims.
It is important to remember that conditional amnesties do not deny past wrong-doing, 
but provide an opportunity to create a historical narrative whilst helping to reconcile a 
society and aid reconstruction. The use of amnesties can also help stabilise a 
society which is undergoing a difficult period of transition.
Truth commissions do provide recognition for past wrong-doing on both an individual 
and institutional level through a more extensive truth-ascertaining process than 
prosecutions. One which the wider community can participate in to produce a 
historical record of the conflict, detail the wrong-doing, and instances of crimes 
committed by a state. Such a process should provide a more fulsome truth which 
victims and the wider community help repair and heal wounds from past conflict.
To repair victims’ harm and promote reconciliation, a truth commission should 
be only one part of a wider programme of reform. A state that establishes a
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truth commission without accompanying reforms raises doubts about its 
commitment to the process of reparation and reconciliation’. 342
The initiation of an investigation and subsequently a prosecution provide some form 
of recognition to victims. However, whilst there are similarities between truth 
commissions and prosecutions, fundamentally, prosecutions are devised to 
prosecute and punish. Drumbl is concerned with using a mechanism which 
concerns itself with individuals to address wrong-doing and help reconcile a post­
conflict state when it is the community, the collective which has also been seriously 
damaged by the conflict. As such, the uses of the alternative mechanisms discussed 
can have a much broader impact than prosecutions alone.
It is difficult to determine in any situation whether truth, justice, recognition and 
contribution to a historical record have been achieved. International courts do not 
operate in a vacuum but are part of numerous efforts to rebuild a transitional society. 
Trials are not ‘ends in themselves’, and can only be successful if other measures are 
simultaneously being taken.343 It might also be the case that some states do not 
want to, or cannot, rebuild the rule of law, such as in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo and Somalia.
The effectiveness of a truth-ascertaining system in a wider sense than the legal 
establishment of guilt depends on the perception of the affected communities. Only 
if they accept the outcome as truthful can this objective be potentially met. The
342 D. Roche, Truth Commission Amnesties and the International Criminal Court,' (2005) 45 British 
Journal of Criminology at 579.
343 M. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment and International Law, (2007) Cambridge University Press at 205 
-209.
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establishment of the truth about a conflict is multi-layered and complex, and there is 
not one mechanism which can fully ascertain the truth.
Arguably, the ICTY has failed to bring the ethnic communities in the former 
Yugoslavia closer together.344 In fact, Clark argues that the ethnic groups still 
believe their own truth, deny their own crimes, and disregard some of the findings 
made by the ICTY. This widespread denial on all sides has obstructed the 
reconciliation process.345 The ICTY has been subject to a number of criticisms from 
both scholars and lawyers.
A notable criticism of the ICTY is that many Serbs argue it is an anti-Serb court, 
particularly because the highest acquittal and low sentencing rate is among the 
Muslim defendants.346 Further obstacles include, the denial by Serbs that the 
massacre at Srebrenica amounted to genocide, the Croats are dissatisfied because 
their main hero, Gotovina, was convicted and the Muslim communities are irritated 
because their heroes had to face international justice too.347 The recent release of 
Gotovina following his conviction being quashed could lead to the appeasement of 
some, whilst reigniting tension from other communities.
Prosecutors by necessity and legal training will always exercise their discretion to 
pursue the most winnable cases, not necessarily the most deserving.348 The 
Prosecutorial Strategy of the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) at the ICC is based on
344J. Clark, Transitional Justice, Truth and Reconciliation: An Under-Explained Relationship,’ (2011)
11 International Criminal Law Review at 247.
345 Ibid at 249
346 Ibid
347 Ibid
348 M. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment and International Law, (2007) Cambridge University Press at 205 
-209.
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four fundamental principles which directly feed into the five objectives for the period 
of 2009-2012.349 The Strategy clarifies the key priorities for the OTP as well as 
providing a statement by which the efficiency of the court can be measured against.
These four principles which underpin the Prosecutorial Strategy are firstly, to adopt a 
positive approach to the principle of complementarity, which provides the Office of 
the Prosecutor will encourage states to pursue national proceedings where 
possible.350 Second, undertake 'focused investigations and prosecutions', which 
drives the Office of the Prosecutor to concentrate on the prosecution of those 
individuals most responsible.351 Third, engage with victims and encourage their 
participation in investigations and prosecutions.352 Fourth, is 'to maximise the impact 
of the activities', which should 'contribute to the prevention of future crimes'.353
These underlining principles have led to the objectives for 2009-2012 to include the 
completion of at least three trials and start proceedings in another case,354 'continue 
with all on-going investigations',355 be proactive in the monitoring of potentially new 
situations which will fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC,356 and to 'enhance 
cooperation with states'.357
349 Office of the Prosecutor, ICC, The Hague, Prosecutorial Strategy 2009-2012,1 February 2010 last 
accessed on 28/11/12 via: http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlvres/66A8DCDC-3650-4514-AA62- 
D229D1128F65/281506/OTPProsecutorialStrateqv20092Q13.pdf
350 Ibid para. 17.
351 Ibid para. 19.
352 Ibid para.22.
353 Ibid para.23
354 Ibid para.25
355 Ibid para.31
356 Ibid para.36
357 Ibid para.41
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This selectivity, whether or not it is a necessity for practical reasons, impacts on 
accountability and the extent in which truth, justice and recognition can be achieved. 
In reality any approach to post-conflict justice that equates accountability with 
retribution not only produces a few ‘officially guilty’, but also provides many more 
‘false innocents’.358 The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) and the ICC are subject to 
constraints, whilst faced with ideological pressures. In essence, the OTP works like 
the Crown Prosecution Service, but is also the Gatekeeper to international justice 
and all that that entails about global law and order after two World Wars.
Mallinder and McEvoy call for ‘broadening the gaze’, which involves looking to other 
social sciences to help provide post-conflict justice.359 Dealing with atrocity requires 
the complex needs of victims to be addressed, needs which arguably go beyond 
those that could be satisfied by simply punishing perpetrators.360
Overview
After a sustained period of conflict where there is a large number of victims, as well 
as perpetrators such as in Rwanda, those left on the ground will be left ‘with a sense 
of disconnection’.361 The ‘disconnection’ occurs in respect of the wider community, 
with the state, the rule of law (or lack thereof) as well as the legal processes taking 
place in international courts.
358 J. Steinhert, ‘Fin de siecle criminology,’ (1997) 1(1) Theoretical Criminology 111-129 in L. Mallinder 
and K. McEvoy, ‘Rethinking amnesties: atrocity, accountability and impunity in post-conflict societies,’ 
(2011) 6(1) Contemporary Social Science at 123.
L. Mallinder and K. McEvoy, ‘Rethinking amnesties: atrocity, accountability and impunity in post­
conflict societies,’ (2011) 6(1) Contemporary Social Science at 123.
360 S. Walklate, Handbook of victims and victimology (2007) Willan, Cullompten.
361 M.J. Gallant and H.M. Rhea, ‘Collective Memory, International Law, and Restorative Social 
Processes After Confalgration: The Holocaust’, (2010) 20(3) International Criminal Justice Review at 
270.
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The individualisation of accountability within international criminal justice has a 
dominant effect on how the international community views victims and the role law 
plays in addressing their individual experiences.362 If we are referring to the 
restoration of a once conflict ridden state, efforts should be made to look at ways to 
heal, what Gallant and Rhea call, ‘the collective’,363 one which moves beyond the 
dominant punitive measures of criminal trials, thereby acknowledging ‘law alone 
cannot appease a community, or those within it, who experienced a terrifying 
past’.364
Fournet emphasises the importance to adapt institutions following a period of conflict 
to aid ‘the recovery process’.365 Therefore, pluralising the response to atrocity in a 
post-conflict society provides an opportunity to come to terms with the past, as well 
as aiding the sense of community, which both help to provide reconciliation. It is 
also imperative for any process to engage with, and actively encourage participation 
by victims, as re-building a state cannot happen without this happening.366
The participation by victims in the investigation and prosecution of the chosen 
perpetrators is said to be encouraged in the Prosecutorial Strategy of the Office of 
the Prosecutor (OTP). It also refers to the issue the ICC will be selective in who it 
chooses to prosecute, which may also hinder the number of victims that are able to 
have a meaningful input in the process. The practical limitations and adversarial
362lbid at 272
363lbid 265-279
364lbid at 272
365 C. Fournet, The Crime of destruction and the law of genocide: Their impact on collective memory, 
(2007) Ashgate Publishing Group, Oxford, UK, in M.J. Gallant and H.M. Rhea, ‘Collective Memory, 
International Law, and Restorative Social Processes After Conflagration: The Holocaust’ (2010) 20(3) 
International Criminal Justice Review at 270.
366 C. Villa-Vicencio, 'Why perpetrators should not always be prosecuted: where the International 
Criminal Court and truth commissions meet', (2000) 49 Emory Law Journal at 209.
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nature of a criminal trial means the prosecution will be restricted and the defence 
advocates will 'produce an array of legal arguments designed to challenge and 
exclude from the court record some of the most basic information used in persuasive 
storytelling and the writing of history'.367 This process is therefore not conducive to 
providing a more fulsome account of the conflict and encounters a number of 
obstacles which limits the extent of the truth-telling. Although, during the course of a 
criminal trial opportunities arise to provide a contested truth.
It has been stated that ‘...virtually all cases of mass abuses, accountability via 
criminal trials must necessarily be selective.’ 368 This is also implied by the 
Prosecutorial Strategy of the OTP at the ICC, which states the ICC will focus on 
those individuals who are viewed as being the most responsible.369 Even if it was 
possible to prosecute all wrong-doers Ratner et al have questioned whether holding 
individuals accountable is enough.370 It could be argued that any response 
undertaken by a state or the international community would never be enough for 
addressing the heinous crimes that fall within international criminal law. International 
criminal law serves two purposes: firstly provides opportunities to confront past 
atrocity and secondly, prevent future conflict.371 This leads to questions over 
whether or not it is possible to fulfil the full extent of these objectives, and in addition, 
how these are measured.
367M. Marrus, History and the Holocaust in the Courtroom, (unpublished manuscript delivered at the 
conference Searching for Memory and Justice: The Holocaust and Apartheid, Yale University, 
February 8-10, 1998) in C. Villa-Vicencio, 'Why perpetrators should not always be prosecuted: where 
the International Criminal Court and truth commissions meet', (2000) 19 Emory Law Journal at 211.
368 N.J. Kritz, 'Coming to Terms with Atrocities: A Review of Accountability Mechanisms for Mass 
Violations of Human Rights’, (1996) 59(4) Law and Contemporary Problems 127-152.
369 The Prosecutorial Strategy (2009-2012) of the Office of the Prosecutor, ICC last accessed via: 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlvres/66A8DCDC-3650-4514-AA62-
D229D1128F65/281506/QTPProsecutorialStrateav20092013.pdf
3/0 S.R. Ratner, J.S. Abrams and J.L. Bischoff, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in 
International Law: Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy, (2009) 3rd Edition, Oxford University Press at 1 -2.
371 Ibid
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There are excessive expectations of international courts and tribunals on what they 
can realistically deliver on behalf of the international community. There is perhaps a 
need to compromise due to the practical difficulties with the number of perpetrators 
involved in past wrong-doing, as well as victims. These practical difficulties are 
inherent in a mechanism which was not designed to address wrong-doing on such a 
large scale.
Concern has been raised on the use of the criminal law and Westernised principles 
of due process to address extraordinary crimes.372 This Westernised assumption 
that justice is achieved through criminal trials often occurs away from the locality of 
the wrong-doing, thereby potentially hindering the impact such trials can have on the 
affected community as they often fail to resonate on the ground. Drumbl questions 
whether criminal trials which have been designed to punish individuals for ‘ordinary’ 
crimes should be the mechanism used for often widespread and systematic 
extraordinary crimes.373
Drumbl goes further and calls into question the move to individual criminal 
accountability when the very nature of the crimes of genocide and crimes against 
humanity, for example, concern a collective group. In this context, a ‘collective’ in 
terms of both perpetrators of heinous crimes as well as their victims. There is also a 
more fundamental problem, the idea of criminality in this context which raises two 
main questions. Firstly, whether or not there can be a crime when there is no rule of 
law to violate. Second, if you can label someone a criminal when there are no social
372 M. Drumbl, Atrocity, punishment, and international criminal law, (2007) Cambridge 
University Press,
373 Drumbl, M. Atrocity, punishment, and international criminal law, (2007) Cambridge 
University Press,
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norms. In essence, the idea of crime presumes the existence of law and in some 
circumstances the law failed to the idea of criminality must too.
Summary
Time has come for modesty as to what these institutions can achieve in terms of 
justice. One of the reasons is that adversarial individual criminal law falls short in 
terms of retribution, deterrence and other goals. The criminal law is built on what 
Drumbl calls a fiction.374 The fiction is wide scale atrocity as being the crime of men, 
atrocity is the crime of individuals but it is also much more. Atrocity is also a product 
of groups and collective action. Yet all the criminal law can do is pin blame on those 
who are the most immediately responsible. It thereby tries to offer a simple solution 
to extremely complex sources of extreme evil. However, in the process, it creates 
authorised narratives of events, neutralises and censures criminal leaders, and 
demonstrates how the rule of law should work. It offers a simple solution which may 
soothe the sensibilities of some and might ease fears, but only blames a handful of 
wrongdoers. Drumbl argues the collective and systemic nature of violence should 
push us beyond the individual based criminal law to actively consider what collective 
justice would look like.375
A post-conflict society is faced with a number of complex issues to help facilitate a 
transition from a previous regime to a new democracy. The issues are of concern to 
the wider community and only through adopting a mechanism which allows for a 
broader perspective can the society move forward. Selective prosecutions are not 
the answer to a post-conflict society and although prosecutions may have to happen
the international community should not underestimate the merits of both conditional 
amnesties and, perhaps more so, truth commissions. Such alternatives provide 
more of an opportunity for the wider community to be involved in a process of truth- 
telling, healing and reconciliation, thereby having a restorative impact on the society. 
These processes are also future-orientated in that they can help facilitate the 
process of lustration, but also provide a greater opportunity to learn from the past 
and to help foster a sense of community to which it can move forward.
The stabilisation of a post-conflict society is paramount to preventing further atrocity. 
As previously discussed in Chapter 3, an amnesty has the potential to facilitate such 
an objective. A post-conflict state, where the bulk of the conflict has ended without 
amnesty, and has achieved stabilisation, it may choose to formally prosecute 
perpetrators or opt for a truth commission. What is clear, is that whichever 
accountability mechanism is used, it is tasked with operating within a complex 
situation and with conflicting demands.
International criminal justice seems to be increasingly concerned with moving unique 
and complex issues within a post-conflict state, viewed by Whiting as the 
‘extraordinary, to the ordinary’.376 Whiting is referring to this push for using a criminal 
justice system which is predicated on prosecutions and punishment and constructed 
within a domestic setting, and transplanting it into an ‘international realm’.377
It is important for international criminal law should be pluralised to formally include
alternative mechanisms to prosecutions which should also allow for local justice, for
376A. Whiting, ‘In International Criminal Prosecutions, Justice Delayed Can Be Justice Delivered’ 
50 Harvard International Law Journal 50, at 339.
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example the use of Gacaca courts in Rwanda. Situations are, and should be, 
treated on a case by case basis and by allowing the possibility of implementing 
alternatives to a situation means a repertoire of mechanisms are at the disposal of 
the international community to address atrocity. Formally legitimising the utility of 
alternative mechanisms, and using in conjunction with prosecutions, could provide 
more accountability than any single mechanism alone.
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion
This thesis began by asking the question: ‘[i]n the pursuit of accountability are there 
more appropriate mechanisms than prosecutions?’. Amnesties and truth 
commissions were chosen as alternatives as they are frequently used, as well as, 
somewhat controversial amongst legal commentators.
A well-constructed amnesty, one described by Slye as being a restorative amnesty, 
would provide some accountability.378 Coupling an amnesty agreement with a truth 
recovery mechanism allows for victims to participate in the process, provides an 
opportunity for truth, thereby creating a narrative of events, and through this process 
provides victims, and other affected groups, a form of recognition.
Arguably, an amnesty often lacks the ability to ascertain truth and provide justice. 
However, amnesties can provide stabilisation within a post-conflict state and enables 
a process of lustration. Amnesties can also end the cycle of conflict and when 
pieced together can help establish the rule of law.
Truth commissions have a wider remit than trials. They take a holistic approach to 
accountability and not only help hold both individuals accountable, but also 
institutions. The very nature and scope of truth commissions are best placed to 
address such things as institutional failings and provide recommendations for reform 
to prevent future conflict Coupled together, truth commissions and amnesties 
provide 'institutional accountability'.
378 R.C. Slye, The Legitimacy of Amnesties Under International Law and General Principles of Anglo- 
American Law: Is a Legitimate Amnesty Possible?’ (2002) 43 Virginia Journal of International Law at 
173.
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Whilst formal prosecutions are the default setting for the international community 
they are not always the most appropriate mechanism. At first glance prosecutions 
seem to be the most effective form of accountability perhaps because they work 
within a legal and recognised process. However, further investigation draws the 
conclusion that lengthy trials and questionable plea-bargains, as in the case of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, diminishes the extent to which 
accountability can be achieved.
‘In certain circumstances, political compromise or alternatives to prosecution may be 
a necessity that cannot be easily escaped.’ This stems from the complex nature of 
a post-conflict society. Each post-conflict state has its own culture, traditions and 
understandings of the concepts of truth, justice and recognition.
Whilst the ICC and prosecutions should not be disregarded as an avenue for 
accountability it is important to be aware that there is no one size fits all approach to 
dealing with the past in a post-conflict society. Therefore, it is important to have a 
repertoire of mechanisms available as a response. Amnesties, truth commissions 
and prosecutions all have their place in international justice. The task is to determine 
which mechanism is the most appropriate and it should be left to states themselves, 
with the support of the international community to determine the most appropriate 
way to reconcile a post-conflict state.
Victim participation is vital to truth ascertainment, the establishment of justice and 
central to the importance of recognition. However, the participation of victims does 
have the potential to burden the system, in particular in criminal trials. Allowing
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victims to be central to any accountability mechanism can only add credibility to the 
role it plays in a post-conflict society. It is important for any mechanism to establish 
safeguards to help prevent re-victimisation.
Although victim participation is important it is also cumbersome when it is 
representative participation, not ‘victim witnesses’ and yet the ICC adopts this 
approach. Thus, spreading into the role usually played by domestic institutions 
might suggest that the international community does not see accountability as wholly 
synonymous with prosecution. Conversely, victim participation might be playing two 
traditional roles. Firstly, they are sometimes witnesses for the prosecution, and 
second, they may have an input on remedies.379 Either way, the international 
community sees recognition as an important part of the ICC both in terms of making 
it part of the elements of the crimes (e.g. gendered crime, racial crime) and through 
more general participation.
This discussion has explored accountability in an international criminal justice 
context. Accountability is achieved through the ascertainment of the truth, and the 
discussion has explored the complexity of ‘truth’, achieving justice and providing 
recognition. No single mechanism can provide a ‘standard model’ of accountability, 
but it may be more appropriate to combine mechanisms to help move towards such 
a goal.
Word count: 28,115.
379 http://jurist.org/paperchase/2012/08/icc-outlines-first-ever-reparation-plan-for-victims.php
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